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INTRODUCTION

In 1998, Professor Burton Weisbrod and several of his colleagues
published a book that chronicled the expanding tendency of
nonprofit organizations to engage in commercial activity.' In his
concluding chapter, Professor Weisbrod offered two striking
examples of this trend. Chicago's Art Institute, Shedd Aquarium,
and Field Museum began holding after-hours cocktail parties as a
sort of upscale bar; and Baptist Hospital, the largest nonprofit
hospital in Nashville, built a $15 million office and training complex
to rent to the Tennessee Titans professional football team, partly
for the revenue it would generate, but also for the marketing
opportunities it offered.' Meanwhile, an article in the Wall Street
Journal in August 2001 noted that churches from Jacksonville,
Florida, to Seattle, Washington are opening restaurants, private
gyms, and even Starbucks coffee franchises.' Underscoring the
current trend, the Yale School of Management announced in early
2002 that it had secured grants totaling $4.5 million from the Pew
Charitable Trusts and the Goldman Sachs Foundation to establish
a program to help charities develop business plans for entry into
commercial markets.4
Commercial activity by charities, however, goes even further in
scope. While individual charitable organizations still exist in our
world, it is now common to find charities engaged in numerous
economic activities through a variety of business arrangements
including subsidiary corporations, joint ventures, and contractual
agreements. The health care sector, in particular, epitomizes the
modem charitable organization in a complex structure. The entity
that started as a single nonprofit corporation operating a local
hospital likely has mushroomed into a multilayered health care
1. To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT (Burton Weisbrod ed., 1998).
2. Burton A. Weisbrod, Conclusions and Public-PolicyIssues: Commercialismand the
Road Ahead, in To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 1, at 288.
3. Elizabeth Bernstein, Holy Frappucino!,WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2001, at W1.
4. Yale School of Management Receives Twin Grants Totaling $4.5 Million from the
Goldman Sachs Foundationand the Pew Charitable Truststo FosterBusinessGrowth Among
Nonprofit Organizations,SOM NEWS, Feb. 8, 2002 (on file with the William and Mary Law

Review and Yale School of Management).
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delivery system, often consisting of a parent holding company with
myriad for-profit or nonprofit subsidiaries, contractual agreements
with doctors and other service providers, and joint venture
participation with other nonprofit and for-profit entities.5

5. One of the more famous recent cases illustrating a complex structure was Geisinger
Health Plan u. Comm'r, 100 T.C. 394 (1993). As explained by the Tax Court:
Petitioner [GHP] owned and operated a health maintenance organization
(HMO) under the Pennsylvania Health Maintenance Organization Act, Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 40, secs. 1551-1567 (Supp. 1991). Petitioner was one of nine
related organizations. The eight other organizations, referred to collectively as
the Geisinger system and described below, were the Geisinger Foundation (the
foundation), Geisinger Medical Center (GMC), Geisinger Clinic (the clinic),
Geisinger Wyoming Valley Medical Center (GWV), Marworth, Geisinger System
Services (GSS), and two professional liability trusts. Each of these eight entities
was recognized by the Internal Revenue Service as an exempt organization
described in sections 170(b(XAXiii), 501(cX3), and 509(aX).
The foundation controlled petitioner and the other entities in the Geisinger
system, as well as three for-profit corporations. The foundation had the power,
under the articles of incorporation and bylaws of petitioner, GMC, GWV, GSS,
the clinic, and Marworth, to appoint the corporate members of those entities,
who in turn elected their respective boards of directors. The foundation's board
of directors was composed of civic and business leaders who were representative
of the general public in northeastern and north-central Pennsylvania and were
public-spirited citizens. The foundation raised funds for the Geisinger system's
numerous charitable purposes and activities.
Id. at 395-96.
Another famous recent example involved Redlands Health Systems, which litigated the
denial of exempt status to one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries, Redlands Surgical Services,
that was a partner with a for-profit health care provider that operated a profitable outpatient
surgery clinic. Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), affd, 242 F.3d 904
(9th Cir. 2001). See generally Howard P. Tuckman, Competition, Commercializationand the
Evolution of NonprofitOrganizationalStructures,in TO PROFIT ORNOT TO PROFIT, supranote
1, at 40-42 (noting how commercialization, particularly in the nonprofit health care sector,
has affected business structures).
Although a large percentage of complex structures come from the health care sector, they
exist in other sectors as well. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-06-046 (Nov. 17, 1994) (ruling on a
case in which a business league exempt under section 501(c)(6) established first- and secondtier subsidiaries to construct and operate a golf course); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,776 (Jan. 4,
1989) (analyzing a situation in which an exempt university controlled a section 501(f)
organization that in turn controlled a taxable subsidiary). See generally FRANCIs R. HILL &
BARBARA L. KIRSCHTEN, FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS

9.01

(1998) (discussing exempt organizations' use of complex structures of related exempt and
taxable entities); James J. McGovern, The Use of Taxable Subsidiary Corporationsby Public
Charities-ATax Policy Issue for 1988,38 TAX NOTES 1125 (1988) (discussing use of taxable
subsidiaries by exempt organizations).
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Tax policy with respect to commercial activity by charitable
organizations leaves much to be desired. The rules on the subject
involve three separate but intimately related tax issues. The first
is whether commercial activity should adversely affect tax
exemption for an organization directly conducting such activity.
Commentators in the tax-exemption field generally refer to this
issue as the "commerciality" doctrine, which holds that charities
engaged in commercial business enterprises can risk their taxexempt status if their business activities grow too large in relation
to their charitable activities.' The second issue is whether, if such
activity is consistent with underlying tax-exempt status, the
commercial activity itself nevertheless should be taxed. This issue
has been the province of the unrelated business income tax (UBIT)
adopted in 1950. 7 The third issue, which relates more to the first
than the second, concerns whether and how commercial activities
undertaken by one organization in a complex structure should be
"imputed" to related entities in that structure for purposes of
judging the related entities' exempt status and conversely whether
the charitable activities of related corporations should be "imputed"
to the corporation conducting the commercial activity in order to
make it tax exempt.8
The relationship between these three broad issues has produced
some very odd administrative rulings and conflicting court
decisions. For example, on the tax-exemption side, the Third Circuit
and the Claims Court disagreed on the exempt status of virtually
identical nondenominational religious publishers.9 Meanwhile,
because it relies on a "relatedness" concept, the UBIT taxes some
(e.g., "unrelated") commercial activity by charitable organizations,
but not other (e.g., "related") commercial activity. The UBIT itself,
however, provides no guidance on whether commercial activity,
even if taxed, should threaten exempt status. On the final issue, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS or Service) has adopted the position
6. JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEVEN SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, CASES AND
MATERIALS 754 (2d ed. 2000); BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
629-31 (7th ed. 1998).

7. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 422, 64 Stat. 906, 950 (1950) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 502, 511-13 (2000)).

8. See infra Part I.C.
9. See infra notes 44-51, 56-60, and accompanying text.
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that individual corporations "stand alone" with respect to charitable
status-that is, the activities carried on in a separate corporate
entity will not be imputed to corporate parents or siblings and viceversa.'0 In contrast, the IRS position with respect to partnership
and other joint venture arrangements is that each partner is
deemed to be in the underlying business of the partnership."
These positions create a curious dichotomy in which business
activities segregated in a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation do
not jeopardize a related entity's exempt status, whereas that status
is threatened by the same activities carried on directly or in a joint
venture or partnership. At the same time, because the UBIT applies
only to "unrelated" business activity, commercial activities carried
on by a subsidiary corporation as stand-alone operations might well
escape taxation if conducted by a parent as a part of the parent's
overall activities if such activity is "related" to the parent's charitable purpose.' 2
Legal academics and economists, like the courts and the Service,
have tended to focus only on the individual pieces of these related
rules, primarily on the UBIT,' s without considering how the pieces
10. See infra Part I.C.1.
11. See infra Part I.C.2.
12. See infranotes 134-37,144-49, and accompanying text (discussing cases in which this
argument was made).
13. Articles regarding the UBIT are legion, spanning theory and practice on both broad
and narrow applications. A recent comprehensive survey of the state of the UBIT is
contained in Donald L. Sharpe, UnfairBusiness Competitionand the Tax on Income Destined
for Charity:Forty-six Years Later, 3 FLA. TAX REV. 367 (1996). All the major treatises on taxexempt organizations contain large sections devoted to the operation of the UBIT. See, e.g.,
HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 5, at ch. 10; HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 645-786. Classic
articles examining the theory of the UBIT include Harvey P. Dale, About the UBIT.... in 18
NYU CONFERENCE ON TAX PLANNING FOR 501(c)(3) ORGANIZATIONS ch. 9 (1990); Boris I.
Bittker & George K Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299,316-26 (1976); Henry B. Hansmann, Unfair Competition
and the UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605 (1989); William A. Klein, Income
Taxation and Legal Entities, 20 UCLA L. REV. 13, 61-68 (1972); Susan Rose-Ackermann,
UnfairCompetitionand CorporateIncome Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1017 (1982); Richard
Steinberg, "Unfair' Competition by Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44 NAT'L TAXJ. 351 (1991).
For a rather cosmic summary of the UBIT in the context of an issue that is still a thorn
today, see Richard L. Kaplan, IntercollegiateAthletics and the Unrelated Business Income
Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430 (1980).
In contrast, relatively little academic writing exists focusing on the commerciality doctrine,
and virtually none on assessing charitable status in complex organizations. On the effects
of commercial activity on exempt status, see Robert J. Desiderio, The ProfitableNonprofit
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fit together as a whole. The purpose of this Article is to take a
broader view: to look at how the various tax rules regulating
commercial activity by charitable organizations relate or fail to
relate, to review how the current rules address the various public
policy concerns with commercial activity, and finally to suggest how
we might restructure our approach to commercial activity to
simplify the doctrinal issues and address the policy concerns at the
same time.
The Article proceeds in three separate parts. Part I traces
the current doctrinal status of the commerciality doctrine, the
relationship of that doctrine to the UBIT, and the tax rules
regarding the effects of commercial activity by related corporations
or partnerships. This Part concludes that current doctrine is largely
a mess, due to the lack of clear rules regarding when commercial
activity endangers exemption or when it is taxable even if it does
not endanger exempt status, and due to the presence of conflicting
rules on how commercial activities within a complex structure
should affect tax exemption overall.
Part II builds on this foundation, sorting through the various
policy issues raised by commercial activity conducted by charities.
This Part begins with an overview of the reasons charities might
conduct direct commercial activity as opposed to passively investing
in stocks and bonds. It then identifies six potential public policy
concerns. The first two are traditional concerns underlying the
UBIT: unfair competition and protecting the corporate tax base.
The other four are broader policy concerns. First is the possibility
that commercial activity diverts the attention of charitable
Corporation:Business Activity and Tax Exemption Under Section 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C., 1
N.M. L. REV. 563 (1971); Kenneth C. Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3) How Much UnrelatedBusinessActivity?, 21 TAXL. REV. 53 (1965); Jessica Pefia & Alexander
L.T. Reid, A Callfor Reform of the OperationalTest for Unrelated CommercialActivity in
Charities,76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1855 (2001); Norman A. Sugarman & Harlan Pomeroy, Business
Income of Exempt Organizations,46 VA. L. REV. 424 (1960); Lawrence Zelenak, Serving Two
Masters: Commercial Hues and Tax Exempt Organizations,8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1
(1984); Comment, Preventing the Operation of Untaxed Business by Tax-Exemption
Organizations,32 U. CmH. L. REV. 581 (1965); Note,ProfitableRelated BusinessActivitiesand
CharitableExemption Under Section 501(c)(3), 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 270 (1976). For a
discussion of the rules regarding assessing charitable status in complex organizations in the
context of health care providers, see John D. Colombo, Health CareReform and Federal Tax
Exemption: Rethinking the Issues, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 215, 248-53 (1994).
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managers from their core charitable mission and, at the extreme,
will turn exempt charities into "for-profits in disguise." Second,
rules regarding commercial activity should promote economic
efficiency. Third, these rules should also provide adequate checks
to determine whether an organization is both worthy and in
need of the additional indirect government subsidies that direct
commercial activities may offer. The final concern is that commercial activity places charitable assets at the risk of liabilities
incurred in noncharitable pursuits.
In this Part, the Article observes that the current rules on
commercial activity address each of these issues in a limited way.
For example, the rules help protect the tax base and limit
charitable asset risk by pressuring charities to use separate
corporate containers for commercial activities. These rules, in conjunction with the corporate separate-identity rule, almost always
result in those separate containers not being eligible for exemption
and therefore subject to taxation. 4 At the same time, these separate
containers help isolate charitable assets from the liabilities of
noncharitable activities and make it more difficult for charities to
minimize the taxable income of these separate organizations by
cross-allocating expenses of running the charitable organization to
the taxable business.
Part III then examines alternative approaches to dealing with
commercial activity. The Article notes that there are two general
policy paths one might take. The first path is to permit charities to
capture premium financial returns on direct commercial activity
as a means for providing an additional indirect government subsidy to these organizations. This Article suggests three different
approaches to commercial activity along this general path: (1)
clarifying the doctrinal structure of current law; (2) enacting new
rules overlaying the current ones designed to control the size and
use of the indirect subsidy; or (3) radically restructuring the tests
for tax exemption to address commercial activity issues at this core
stage. The Article concludes that only a radical restructuring of the
tests for tax exemption, such as adopting the donative theory that

14. See discussion infra Part II.B.l.d.
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Professor Mark Hall and I proposed in the early 1990s, 5 would
address all the policy concerns raised by this approach to commercial activity.
The Article then examines a completely different path for dealing
with commercial activity. This second path would attempt to
eliminate the economic incentive for direct commercial activities
by expanding the UBIT into a "commerciality tax" with the simultaneous repeal of the commerciality doctrine and the corporate
separate-identity rule.1" Such a tax, previously suggested by
commentators primarily as a means for controlling "unfair"
competition, would also address all other policy concerns with
commercial activity as well as facilitate simplification of the rules
regarding exempt status.
This latter path, however, requires a fundamental threshold
decision: that the current policy problems with commercial activity
by exempt charities outweigh the benefits of the indirect subsidy
that charities currently can capture under our system. The Article
concludes that the doctrinal problems with defining the appropriate
scope of commercial activity and the empirical evidence of
widespread increases in such activity by exempt charities do, in
fact, outweigh the benefits of leaving the current system in place.
Thus, if we are not prepared to adopt a radical restructuring of the
tests for exemption (the best solution to the commerciality issue),
then we should seriously consider the second path of expanding the
UBIT to cover all commercial activities as an alternative way to
address the policy issues raised.
I. BACKGROUND: CURRENT LAW & DOCTRINE
A. The Effect of Direct CommercialActivity on CharitableStatus
The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) is nothing if not amusing.
Section 501(c)(3) of the I.R.C. states in no uncertain terms that
an organization will qualify for tax exemption as a charitable
15. See Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1384-89 (1991).
16. See James Bennett & Gabriel Rudney, A Commerciality Test to Resolve the
CommercialNonprofit Issue, 36 TAX NOTES 1095, 1095-96 (1987).
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organization if it is "organized and operated exclusively" for a
charitable purpose. 1 7 This section, however, has almost never been
interpreted literally. As early as 1924, the Supreme Court held that
a small amount of noncharitable commercial activity was consistent
with charitable status,'8 and regulations under § 501(c)(3) adopted
the view that "exclusively" does not mean "exclusively" at allinstead, the regulations tell us that "exclusively" really means
"primarily. " 19 The Treasury Regulations then follow this revelation
with a more cryptic statement: "An organization will not be so
regarded [that is, regarded as being operated exclusively for a
charitable purpose] if more than an insubstantial part of its
activities is not in furtherance of an exempt purpose."20 Two
subsections later, however, the Regulations inform us:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3)
although it operates a trade or business as a substantialpart of
its activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in
furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose or purposes
and if the organization is not organized or operated for the
primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business
21

Moreover, although all exempt charities must be nonprofit
organizations, "nonprofit" does not mean that the organization is
prohibited from making an economic profit. Rather, the word refers

17. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000) (emphasis added). One should note that § 501(cX3) is but one
of many subsections of § 501 providing tax exemption for specific entities, and that these
other exempt organizations also are subject to UBIT. Exempt charities, however, constitute
by far the largest dollar piece of the exemption puzzle and enjoy unique tax advantages
(primarily the ability to receive tax-deductible donations under § 170 and the ability to issue
tax-exempt bonds under § 145) denied to other exempt organizations. See JOHN D. COLOMBO
& MARKA. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAXEXEMPTION 7-8,20-21 (1995). As a result, this Article

concentrates solely on the charitable exemption of § 501(c)(3) and related UBIT issues.
18. Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden, 263 U.S. 578, 582 (1924).
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990) ("An organization will be
regarded as 'operated exclusively' ... ifit engages primarilyin activities which accomplish one
or more ... exempt purposes ....") (emphasis added).

20. Id. (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(eX1) (emphasis added).
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to the rule that nonprofit organizations cannot distribute profits to
shareholders or other individuals as a return on investment.2 2
Put another way, the regulations appear to say that if
commercial activity is conducted directly by an exempt organization
but is "insubstantial" in relation to the exempt organization's
charitable activities, the commercial activity will not affect exempt
status. If the commercial activity is substantial, however, then it
potentially jeopardizes exempt status, unless the activity is "in
furtherance of" the entity's exempt purpose. Unfortunately, legal
doctrine in this area is a morass. As detailed below, the IRS
inconsistently invokes the commerciality doctrine and courts
rarely, if ever, analyze the issues in the linear manner presented
in the regulations. As a result, key issues such as the definition
of "substantial" and "in furtherance of' have gone largely unaddressed.
The commerciality doctrine can be traced to a 1924 Supreme
Court case, Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores de la
Provincia del Santisimo Rosario de Filipinas,' concerning an
exempt religious order that had extensive real estate and stock
investments and was engaged in limited sales of wine, chocolate,
and other articles. The government challenged the exempt status
of the Order on the grounds that these "commercial" activities were

22. Professor Henry Hansmann coined the phrase "nondistribution constraint" for this
limitation. As explained by Professor Hansmann: "It should be noted that a nonprofit
organization is not barred from earning a profit. Many nonprofits in fact consistently show
an annual accounting surplus. It is only the distribution of the profits that is prohibited."
Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980)
(footnotes omitted). See generally FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 2-3. The I.R.C.
adopts the nondistribution constraint via its requirement in § 501(c)(3) that, in order to be
exempt, "no part of the net earnings [of the organization] ... inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual." I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)1(c)(2). The Treasury Regulations enforce the no inurement rule by requiring an exempt
charity to have a dissolution provision in its governing documents indicating that proceeds
of the charity's liquidation will be paid to another exempt charity or to the government. Id.
§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(bX4).
Note that the nondistribution constraint does not prohibit an exempt charity from
engaging in all sorts of economic transactions with private individuals, including payments
for services rendered, property sales and rentals, loans, and so forth, as long as such
transactions are at arm's length and constitute payments for services rendered or the fair
market value of goods received. See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Nov. 22, 1991).
23. 263 U.S. 578 (1924).
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inconsistent with exempt status.2 4 Finding that the activities were
a "negligible factor""5 in the operations of the Order, the Court
upheld the exemption. Nevertheless, the case sowed the seeds of the
commerciality doctrine and at the same time established what
became known as the "destination-of-income" test for exemption: if
the income from business activities was used to promote charitable
purposes, the income would not be taxed.2 6 Eventually, courts
expanded the "destination-of-income" rule to permit exemption of
a separate corporation conducting a business whose profits were
distributed to charity.2 7 In 1945, however, the Court in Better
Business Bureau v. United States28 held that the Better Business
Bureau could not escape liability for social security taxes under
language in the Social Security Act that mirrored I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)
because the organization was not "exclusively" organized for
educational purposes. The Court noted that under the statute:
[Tihe presence of a single noneducational purpose, if substantial
in nature, will destroy the exemption regardless of the number
or importance of truly educational purposes.... [Ilt being
apparent beyond dispute that an important, if not the primary,
pursuit of petitioner's organization is to promote not only an
ethical but also a profitable business community. The exemption
is therefore unavailable to petitioner.2 9
By the mid-1940s, therefore, two distinct strands of legal analysis
came to bear on commercial activities of charities. On the one hand,
the destination-of-income test permitted charities to engage in
commercial activity free from taxation as long as the profits from

24. Id. at 581.
25. Id. at 582.
26. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 754; HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 5, at
10-4; HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 633-34.
27. See, e.g., Roche's Beach, Inc. v. Comm'r, 96 F.2d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding

exempt a separate corporation that owned improved beachfront property where the income
of the corporation was used to support a charitable foundation). See generally FISHMAN &
SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 754-55 (discussing the origin of the destination-of-income rule);
HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 5, at 10-6 to 10-7 (discussing how the destination-of-income

test evolved through case law).
28. 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
29. Id. at 283.
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that activity were used for charitable purposes.30 At the same time,
in Better Business Bureau, the Court indicated that if commercial
activity was itself a significant purpose of a nonprofit organization,
that organization could not be exempt.al
These two analytical strands appeared to be in direct conflict.
Given the Better Business Bureau precedent, one would think that
later court decisions would have prohibited exempting a "feeder"
organization created for the sole purpose of operating a commercial
business and funneling the profits to a charity. The IRS certainly
took the hint. In what is one of the most famous exemption
decisions in history, the Service argued that Mueller Macaroni
Company, owned at that time by New York University, violated the
primary purpose test because it did nothing but operate a for-profit
business and funnel revenues to New York University's law
school.3 2 The Third Circuit, however, upheld exemption for Mueller
and distinguished Better Business Bureau on the grounds that the
Better Business Bureau's overall purpose was not charitable, but
rather was directed toward benefitting"private interest [s]," such as
the commercial business community. 3
The congressional response to cases like Mueller did not clarify
the relationship between commercial activity and exempt status.
As highly publicized cases of exempt organizations engaging in
commercial activities, either directly or through separate related
"feeder" corporations, began working their way through the courts,
hearings on the issue began in 1942."' These hearings quickly
zeroed-in on the loss of tax revenue from the acquisition by
exempt organizations of previously taxable businesses and unfair
competition by nonprofits with for-profits as the major policy
problems. 5 In what is perhaps one of the funniest quotes by a
legislator on tax policy, Representative John Dingell warned,

30. See sources cited supra note 27.
31. Better Bus. Bureau, 326 U.S. at 283.
32. C.F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 190 F.2d 120, 121 (3d Cir. 1951).
33. Id. at 122.
34. See Revenue Revision of1942: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
77th Cong. (1942).
35. See id. at 89 (statement of Randolph Paul, Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the
Treasury); see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 6, at 755; Dale, supra note 13, § 9.02,
at 9-5 to 9-8; Sharpe, supranote 13, at 380-83.
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"Eventually all the noodles produced in this country will be
produced by corporations held or created by universities .... 86
To address these concerns, Congress enacted the UBIT in 1950,
which imposed a tax on "unrelated" business activities and denied
exemption to "feeder" organizations, thus ending the destination-ofincome test. 7 Unfortunately, the law adopted by Congress to
address these issues did not approach taxation of commercial
activities by judging either their competitive effects or their
potential for tax base erosion.3" Instead, Congress adopted a
relatedness test that attempted to tax only the revenue from
commercial activities "unrelated" to the charitable purpose of the
exempt organization.3 9 Moreover, in enacting the UBIT, Congress
also did not specifically address the underlying issue concerning
whether excessive commercial activity should cause a loss of exempt
status for the entity conducting that activity, and if so, how much
such activity was excessive. The dividing line, therefore, between
commercial activity taxed under the UBIT but not affecting
underlying exemption and commercial activity that did impair
underlying exemption, went unresolved. In fact, the enactment of
the UBIT in some ways exacerbated the problem because the
existence of a separate tax on "unrelated" business indicated that
Congress believed some significant level of unrelated commercial
activity was nevertheless consistent with underlying exempt status;
how much, however, no one was willing to say.4"
As a result, during the period from 1950 to 1959, the IRS
struggled to produce new regulations under §501(c)(3) to shed light
on this issue."' The final regulations adopted in 1959 appeared to
36. Revenue Revision of 1950: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means,
81st Cong. 580 (1950) (statement of Rep. John Dingell).

37. Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, § 422, 64 Stat. 906, 950 (codified as amended at I.R.C.

§§ 502, 511-13 (2000)).
38. See John Copeland & Gabriel Rudney, BusinessIncome ofNonprofits and Competitive

Advantage, 33 TAXNOTES 747, 750 (1986); Dale, supra note 13, § 9.04, at 9-11.
39. Revenue Act of 1950 § 422.
40. See Kenneth C. Eliasberg, Charity and Commerce: Section 501(c)(3)-How Much
Unrelated Business Activity?, 21 TAx L. REv. 53, 79-93 (1965). Eliasberg notes that in
enacting the UBIT, Congress did not change the underlying primary purpose test, and that
prior to IRS regulations issued in 1959, "it was generally assumed that as long as an
organization's 'primary purpose' was one described in ... [§ 501(c)(3)], any amount of
unrelated business activity would not endanger exempt status." Id. at 93.
41. New regulations were originally proposed in 1956, however, the IRS then took three

20021

CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION

501

accept the view that substantial unrelated business activity was
consistent with exempt status, as long as operating an unrelated
business was not the "primary purpose" of the organization seeking
exemption. 2 Nevertheless, the Service continued to use the
commerciality doctrine, by citing the language in the Supreme
Court's Better Business Bureau opinion,' to challenge the exempt
status of organizations conducting significant business activities.
The IRS did so even though Mueller, the enactment of the UBIT,
and the IRS' own regulations clearly implied that significant
commercial activity should not impair exempt status when the
revenues from such activity are dedicated to a charitable purpose.
This revival of the commerciality doctrine began in earnest in
1961 with the first of a series of cases dealing with nondenominational religious publishers. In ScripturePressFoundation
v. United States," the taxpayer, Scripture Press, was formed
primarily to improve the quality of teaching texts for Protestant
Sunday schools.' The company soon found itself highly successful
in preparing and selling a variety of religious literature,
accumulating more than $1.6 million in surplus earnings by 1957.46
As a result, the IRS revoked exempt status for the organization,
claiming that, in effect, it was nothing more than a for-profit
publisher and hence no longer was operated primarily for charitable purposes. 4'7 The Claims Court agreed with the IRS, noting
that Scripture Press priced its products similarly to for-profit
competitors and amassed significant profits. 4' Though it had an
educational program aimed at promoting and expanding Sunday
school instruction, the court found that expenditures on educational
activities were "unaccountably small" in comparison to the surplus
that Scripture Press accumulated annually. 9 Accordingly, the
years to "reconsider" them before issuing a substantially revised version in 1959 as the final
regulations. Id. at 95-96.
42. T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 145.
43. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-505, 1971-2 C.B. 232 (citing Better Business Bureau and
denying exemption).
44. 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
45. Id. at 803.
46. Id. at 804.
47. Id. at 801-02.
48. Id. at 805-06.
49. Id. at 805.
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court concluded that Scripture Press was not operated primarilyfor
charitable purposes.50 Subsequently, the Tax Court and federal
district courts upheld the IRS' revocation of exemption in a number
of other publishing cases. 5 '
As a result of Scripture Press and subsequent cases, by the early
1980s the Tax Court had developed the view that an organization
conducting a significant activity with a "commercial hue" risked
losing exempt status.5 2 Factors contributing to this impermissible
"hue" included the presence of substantial overall profits, use of
commercial pricing methods with substantial net profit margins,
and competition with for-profit firms in the same sector. 53 In 1991,
the Seventh Circuit adopted this basic analysis in the context of an
organization affiliated with the Seventh-day Adventist Church that
operated vegetarian restaurants and health food stores, ostensibly
to advance church doctrine relating to diet.5 4 In reviewing a Tax
Court opinion denying exempt status to the organization, the
Seventh Circuit identified several factors leading to a conclusion
that the organization violated the commerciality doctrine. These
included: (1) direct competition with commercial firms, including
similar locations (in shopping centers) and similar hours of
operation; (2) a pricing structure designed to produce a profit; (3)
extensive advertising and use of commercial advertising materials;
and (4) a lack in the record of any showing of donations to the
parent organization.55

50. Id. at 806 ("We think the plaintiffcould not make a showing that itsprimarypurpose
was educational any more than it was able to make a showing that its primarypurpose was

religious.").
51. See, e.g., Inc. Trs. of Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 381
(D.D.C. 1981), affd, 672 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 292
F. Supp. 219,221 (D. Mass. 1968), rev'd, 412 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 1969); Fides Publishers
Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924, 936 (N.D. Ind. 1967); Presbyterian & Reformed
Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 79 T.C. 1070, 1090 (1982), rev'd, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).

52. See, e.g., Presbyterian& Reformed Publ'g, 79 T.C. at 1083.
53. Id. at 1083-85.
54. Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r, 950 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1991) ("According to its
articles of incorporation, Living Faith was established for the purpose of keeping with the
doctrines of the Seventh-day Adventist Church .... Good health, according to Seventh-day
Adventists, promotes virtuous conduct, and is furthered by a vegetarian diet and abstention
from tobacco, alcohol, and caffeine.").
55. Id. at 373-74.
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Neither the IRS nor the courts, however, have applied this
commercial hue analysis consistently. In 1984, for example, the
Third Circuit reversed the revocation of exempt status for a
religious publisher in Presbyterian& Reformed PublishingCo. v.
Commissioner, 6 a case substantially similar to Scripture Press.
The taxpayer in Presbyterian& Reformed Publishingwas a highly
profitable nondenominational religious publisher that priced its
products at market.5 7 The Tax Court upheld an IRS revocation of
exempt status on the ground of impermissible commercial hue,
based primarily on the large profits generated by the taxpayer's
publishing business.58 The Third Circuit reversed, noting that
"success in terms of audience reached and influence exerted, in
and of itself, should not jeopardize the tax-exempt status of
organizations which remain true to their stated goals."59 A
charitable organization, according to the Third Circuit, should be
able to make money to expand its audience and influence; doing so
does not make the organization any less charitable.60 Similarly, the
Tax Court itself approved exemption in several "resale shop" cases
-situations in which a nonprofit enterprise primarily operated a
business selling crafts produced by a particular group. In the late
1970s, for example, the Tax Court approved exemption for an
organization that imported, purchased and sold artists' crafts, 8 ' an
organization that purchased and sold products manufactured by
blind individuals,62 and an organization that operated two public
art galleries.6" A federal appellate court also reversed a lower court
ruling upholding a revocation of exemption on commerciality
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).
Id. at 151.
Presbyterian& Reformed Publ'g, 79 T.C. at 1088-89.
Presbyterian& Reformed Publ'g, 743 F.2d at 158.
Id. at 158-59.

61. Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 202, 212, 216 (1978). The organization
claimed the following charitable purposes: "(1) Helping disadvantaged artisans in poverty
stricken countries to subsist and to preserve their craft; and (2) furnishing services to taxexempt museums by providing museum stores with representative handicrafts from
disadvantaged countries." Id. at 209.

62. Indus. Aid for the Blind v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 96,97, 103 (1979). The charitable purpose
was to provide employment for the blind and thus came within the regulations' statement

that a charitable purpose includes "relief of the poor and distressed or underprivileged." Id.
at 101; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1(d) (as amended in 1990).
63. Goldsboro Art League v. Comm'r, 75 T.C. 337, 340, 346 (1980).
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grounds when the taxpayer, a publishing company, showed that it
had no "operational profits." 4 The IRS itself has approved taxexempt status for charities engaging in activities with decidedly
commercial hues. For example, hospitals and educational organizations can operate health clubs that charge fees similar to forprofit competitors without endangering exempt status, although the
income from these activities may in part be subject to taxation
under the UBIT."5
The commercial hue analysis also is inconsistent with other
aspects of exemption. As many commentators have observed,
private nonprofit hospitals essentially conduct fee-for-service
business enterprises that operate virtually indistinguishably from,
and compete directly with, for-profit counterparts.66 To date,
however, neither the Service nor any court has suggested that
exempt hospitals suffer from impermissible commercial hue. The
inconsistency, moreover, extends in reverse: The Eighth Circuit
once held that a pharmacy that clearly was not operated in a
commercial manner, selling only to the elderly and poor at a fixed
rate above cost, was not exempt because a pharmacy was inherently
a commercial enterprise not deserving of exemption. 7
Part of the problem with this area is that neither the courts nor
the Service appear to use the analytical framework provided by the
regulations-that is, the two-step analysis of "is it substantial"
followed by "is it in furtherance of an exempt purpose. "6S Instead,
64. Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 1969).

65. See Virginia Richardson et al.,HealthClubs, in INTERNALREVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION

PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, at 11 (2001) (indicating that the operation of a health club
by a university or hospital generally does not affect exempt status, but income from
memberships sold to general public, as opposed to students and faculty or patients and staff
is generally taxable under UBIT).
66. See, e.g., Frank A. Sloan, Commercialism in Nonprofit Hospitals, in TO PROFIT OR

NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 1, at 151-68 (analyzing various empirical studies showing that
nonprofit hospitals 'are similar in provision of uncompensated care, in quality of care, and
in adoption of technology"); Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Charitable Status of
NonprofitHospitals:Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307,375
(1991) ("For the most significant measures of hospital performance--quality and cost-there
is little or no difference between [nonprofit and for-profit hospitals]."); David A. Hyman, The
Conundrumof Charitability:Reassessing Tax Exemption for Hospitals, 16 AM. J.L. & MED.
327, 333, 351 (1990).
67. Fed'n Pharmacy Servs. v. Comm'r, 625 F.2d 804, 809 (8th Cir. 1980).
68. T.D. 6391, 1959-2 C.B. 139, 145.
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the predominant doctrinal approach that appears to be used in
practice by both the Service and many courts is first to determine
whether an activity is conducted in a commercial manner 69 and if
so, to determine whether that activity is a substantial purpose of
the exempt organization, in which case, exemption is denied. The
question of whether the commercial activity, even if substantial, is
"in furtherance of" an exempt purpose is usually ignored.
In Scripture Press, for example, the Claims Court appeared to
accept the proposition that the taxpayer had a valid religious
purpose in seeking to promote the growth of its Sunday school. The
court, however, then phrased the key issue as whether the
operation of the publishing business was "incidental" to promoting
Sunday school or the other way around.7 ° In other words, the court
made "substantiality" the key analytical concept. As a result, the
Claims Court considered the case closed once it found the
publishing business of Scripture Press was indeed "commercial in
nature" and that the profits from the publishing business dwarfed
expenditures on the Sunday school activity.7" The court simply
never asked the question contemplated by the regulations as to
whether the commercial activity was nevertheless in furtherance of
an exempt purpose. If it had, the case would have quickly become
very complicated. Courts in several other cases have approved the
proposition that disseminating religious doctrine is a valid religious
purpose under § 501(c)(3).72 Accordingly, is not publishing religious
literature, even if done as a for-profit business, in furtherance of
that purpose? The Third Circuit in Presbyterian & Reformed
Publishing certainly seemed to think so. Although it failed to
rely specifically on the "in furtherance of concept in upholding
exemption for the taxpayer in that case, the court did recognize that

69. See Presbyterian& Reformed Publ'g, 79 T.C. at 1083-85 (outlining the criteria to
determine whether an activity is conducted in a commercial manner).
70. ScripturePress,285 F.2d at 804.
71. Id. at 807.
72. E.g., Pulpit Res. v. Comn'r, 70 T.C. 594, 610-11 (1978) (finding that the publication
of sermons and resources for religious preaching is a charitable purpose); A.A. Allen
Revivals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 1623, 1632 (1963) (holding that the promulgation
of religious beliefs is a religious purpose and that publication and sale of religious materials
advanced that purpose); St. Germain Found. v. Comm'r, 26 T.C. 648,657 (1956) (finding that
propagating teachings of the "I AM" religion is an exempt purpose).
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a profitable publishing business was not necessarily inconsistent
with charitable objectives.73
Similarly, courts have sent decidedly mixed signals on the
"in furtherance of" language in other commerciality cases. In
Aid to Artisans, Inc. v. Commissioner,74 the court found that the
import and sale of handicrafts from economically disadvantaged
individuals was "in furtherance of" the exempt purpose of helping
economically disadvantaged artisans.75 In IndustrialAid for the
Blind v. Commissioner,7' however, the Tax Court found the sale of
items produced by blind craftsmen "is an exempt activity in and of
itself," 77 apparently rejecting the notion that the activity was a
noncharitable commercial activity because of the relatively small
profit produced and the fact that most of this small profit was paid
as a salary bonus to the blind workers. Finally, in Goldsboro Art
League v. Commissioner,78 the court appeared to conclude that the
art galleries operated by the taxpayer were not operated with a
sufficient commercial hue to endanger exempt status. Again, this
result was apparently due to the very small profit and absence of a
commercial focus in selecting art works for exhibition. 79 These cases
thus appear to more closely track the commerciality approach of
ScripturePress, analyzing whether an activity is truly commercial,
and if so, whether it was substantial, than the approach of the
regulations. The publishing cases, moreover, indicate a similar
trend. Aside from Presbyterian& Reformed Publishing,the cases
supporting exemption for organizations engaged in publishing
activities appear to do so either because the publishing activity is
not profitable, hence in the courts' view, not really commercial, 0 or
73. Presbyterian& Reformed Publ'g, 743 F.2d at 158; see supra text accompanying notes
59-60.
74. 71 T.C. 202 (1978).
75. Id. at 214 ("Thus, the sale of handicrafts ... is neither an exempt purpose as argued

by petitioner nor a nonexempt purpose as argued by [the IRS]. Rather, such sale is merely
an activity carried on by Aid to Artisans in furtherance of its exempt purposes.").
76. 73 T.C. 96 (1979).
77. Id. at 101-03.
78. 75 T.C. 337 (1980).

79. Id. at 344-45.
80. See, e.g., Elisian Guild, Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir. 1969)
(finding that the lack of operational profits indicated lack of commercial purpose and noting
that "deficit operation reflects not poor business planning nor ill fortune but rather the fact
that profits were not the goal of the operation"); Golden Rule Church Ass'n v. Comm'r, 41
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because the publishing activity was a minor part of overall revenues
and expenses. 81 In contrast, exemption was revoked in cases in
which profits were large and only modest amounts of other
charitable activity occurred, all with little or no analysis
of whether
8 2
publishing was in furtherance of an exempt purpose.
As a doctrinal matter, neither the courts nor the IRS appear to
follow the 1959 regulations' analysis of how commercial activities
should affect exempt status. Instead of the 1959 regulations' view
that only a primary purpose to operate an unrelated business
presents an exemption problem, the case law and IRS arguments
presented in litigated cases appear to assert that any substantial
commercial activity presents an exemption problem. Nevertheless,
there are enough significant exceptions to this "is it commercial; is
it substantial" approach' that making doctrinal generalizations is
very hazardous to one's exempt status.
B. The Relationship of the CommercialityDoctrine to the UBIT
and the Commensurate-In-Scope Test
Another major problem with determining the effects of commercial activity based on exempt status is that neither the Service
nor the courts have specifically defined how the primary purpose
test for exemption interfaces with the UBIT. As noted above, the
adoption ofthe UBIT in 1950 (in lieu of banning commercial activity
by exempt charities entirely) implicitly recognized that many
exempt charities would, in fact, engage in significant commercial
activities both related and unrelated to the charities' exempt
purpose, and that those activities would not result in loss of

T.C. 719, 731 (1964) (rejecting the IRS' contention that conducting training programs for a
fee violated commerciality doctrine and stating, "we regard consistent nonprofitability as
evidence of the absence of commercial purposes').
81. See, e.g., A. A. Allen Revivals v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 1623, 1632 (1963) (finding
that modest profits from publications were spent on advancing religious beliefs and that
profit is not a violation of the commerciality limitation).
82. See, e.g., Inc. Trs. of Gospel Worker Soc'y v. United States, 510 F. Supp. 374, 378-79
(1981); Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924,936 (1967); ScripturePress,
285 F.2d at 807.
83. See, e.g., Presbyterian& Reformed Publ'g, 743 F.2d at 148; Fed. Pharmacy Serve. v.
Comm'r, 625 F.2d 804, 804 (8th Cir. 1980).
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underlying tax exemption. 8' The UBIT, however, operates using a
relatedness concept,8 5 whereas tax exemption uses the "primary
purpose/in furtherance oF test described above,86 leaving the intersection of these rules unclear.
Case law sheds virtually no light on the overall interface between
taxing commercial activity and revoking tax exemption because of
it. IRS litigating strategy tends to present cases as either exemption
cases or UBIT cases, so courts rarely have had the opportunity to
consider the relationship between the two doctrines.8 7 Take, for
example, the two main religious publishing cases, Scripture Press
and Presbyterian& Reformed PublishingCo., described above. 8 In
each case, the Service sought revocation of exemption, not
imposition of the UBIT on the publishing revenues.8 9 As a result,
neither court analyzed whether the publishing activity was
"related" or "unrelated" to the taxpayer's exempt purposes, or
whether a better analytical approach would have been to concede
that the entities involved had valid religious or educational
purposes (and were therefore nominally exempt) but instead
concluded that the revenues from the publishing business should be
taxed under the UBIT.9 ° On the other hand, cases involving the
UBIT never consider whether the commercial activity that the
Service seeks to tax should result in loss of tax exemption. A perfect
example of this is Carle Foundation v. United States,9 1 where the
Service claimed that pharmacy sales to the general public

84. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Obviously, if any level of commercial
activity, related or unrelated, caused loss of exemption, there would be no need for a separate
tax on the commercial activities of exempt organizations.
85. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
87. See Pefia & Reid, supra note 13, at 184 ("Although the Service recognizes that there
is a relationship between the operational test and UBIT ....it is commonplace for the Service
to make a UBIT determination without ever questioning whether or not the charity
continues to qualify for exemption.").
88. See supra notes 44-60 and accompanying text.
89. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g Co. v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984);
Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800, 801 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
90. Cf Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-36-001, 8 (January 4, 1995) (concluding that large scale
publishing business by religious educational organization was subject to UBIT but did not
endanger exempt status). See infra notes 103-08 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this memorandum.
91. 611 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir. 1979).
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constituted unrelated business income to an exempt hospital.92 The
IRS never raised, and the courts never considered, whether such
sales, if "unrelated," should cause loss of exempt status.
The overall structure of the UBIT does suggest a few answers to
this quandary. The regulations under the UBIT define a "related"
activity as one that has a "causal relationship" to the achievement
of the exempt purpose, excluding that of simply supplying income
for use in exempt activities.9" If such a causal relationship exists,
then surely the activity must also be in furtherance of the exempt
purpose.94 Moreover, it is hard to believe that in adopting the
UBIT, Congress believed activity escaping taxation under the UBIT
should nevertheless create problems for tax exemption. As a result,
one can fairly conclude that commercial activity "related" for UBIT
purposes ought not have any adverse exemption effects.
If commercial activity is unrelated for UBIT purposes, however,
the analysis of the effects of that activity on exempt status is
very murky. As noted above, section 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) of the 1959
regulations appears to contemplate that even "unrelated" activity
can be in furtherance of an exempt purpose, and that a substantial
amount of such unrelated activity can be viewed as consistent with
exempt status.95 If this were not the case, presumably there would
be no need for the statement later in the regulation that exemption
will be denied where an organization's "primary purpose" is to
operate an unrelated business" because section 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1)
already prohibits any substantial activity not in furtherance of an
exempt purpose.97
Although the 1959 regulations fail to define the "in furtherance
of' concept, several IRS rulings suggest that the key issue in
determining whether substantial unrelated business activity is
consistent with underlying exemption is whether the revenues from
92. Id. at 1194.
93. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983).
94. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supranote 6, at 646 (stating that "conventional thinking" is that
exempt status is threatened only by unrelated business activity).
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(e) (as amended in 1990); see supra notes 19-21 and
accompanying text.
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(cX3)-1(e) (as amended in 1990).
97. Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(cXl). This is a threshold presumably far below the "primary
purpose" language in regulations section 1.501(cX3)-1(e). See supra note 96 and

accompanying text.
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such business are used to cross-subsidize charitable activity. This
approach, sometimes referred to in Service rulings as the
"commensurate-in-scope" doctrine, appears to have originated in a
1964 Revenue Ruling upholding the exempt status of a charitable
organization deriving its revenues largely from renting space in
a commercial office building.98 The revenues were used to make
grants to other charitable entities, and the IRS ruled that the
organization was entitled to retain its exempt status under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) because it was carrying on a charitable program
commensurate in scope with its financial resources." The doctrine
appeared again in a 1971 General Counsel's Memorandum, in
which the Service cautioned its agents against using unrelated
business income as a test for whether an organization was due an
underlying exemption:
[A) side from express statutory limitations on business activity,
such as section 502 and the newly enacted provisions relating
to private foundations, there is no quantitative limitation on
the "amount" of unrelated business an organization may engage
in under section 501(c)(3), other than that implicit in the
fundamental requirement of charity law that charity properties
must be administered exclusively in the beneficial interest ofthe
charitable purpose to which the property is dedicated.
...
[Flor some time now it has been increasingly apparent that
our earlier approach to the problem of permissibility or nonpermissibility of business activities of charities has been based
on a misconception that somehow in the enactment of the
provisions for exemptions of charities from income tax, Congress
intended an implied restriction on the extent of their engagement in business activities. In the years past, the Service sought
by ruling and by litigation to deny the right of charities to
engage in business, insisting that somewhere, somehow in the
enactment of the exemption provisions Congress must have
intended to limit the classification of exempt charities to those
charities not engaging to any substantial extent in commercial
endeavors."°
98. See Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186-87.
99, Id.
100. Gen. Couns. Mem. 34,682 (Nov. 17, 1971).
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As noted above, however, the admonition in this Memorandum
against using unrelated business activity as a basis for revoking
exempt status did not appear to filter down to IRS litigators, who
throughout the next three decades continued to challenge exempt
status for organizations operating commercial businesses, rather
than arguing that such businesses should be taxed under the UBIT
while leaving baseline exempt status intact.10 '
This schizophrenia apparently exists even today.'0 2 On the one
hand, two unique IRS determinations specifically considering both
the exemption and UBIT effects of commercial activity support the
view that substantial unrelated business activity will not adversely
affect exempt status, provided the revenues from such unrelated
activity are used to fund clearly charitable activities. In a 1995
Technical Advice Memorandum, the Service analyzed a case
involving an exempt religious organization that published textbooks
and other instructional materials for religious schools.

03

The

organization started its publishing activities to supply its own
schools with textbooks, but soon expanded to provide religiousoriented textbooks to schools worldwide.' Revenues from the
publishing business constituted more than half the total gross
revenues of the organization, and its profit margins were as high as
seventy-five percent, although expenditures on the publishing
business were less than half the organization's total expenditures. 105

Finding the publishing activities virtually indistinguishable from
those of a commercial religious publisher and that they were not
substantially related to the educational activity of operating its own
religious schools, the Service concluded that the profits were subject
to the UBIT."° At the same time, however, the Service concluded
that the obviously substantial nature of the publishing business
did not endanger the taxpayer's exempt status because "[tihere
is no evidence that any of the funds generated by [the publishing
101. See supranote 43 and accompanying text.
102. See generally Evelyn Brody, A Taxing Time for Bishop Estate: What is the I.R.S. Role
in Charity Governance?, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 575-76 (1999) (discussing the checkered

history of the commensurate-in-scope doctrine).
103. Tech. Adv. Mem. 96-36-001 (Jan. 4, 1995).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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business] were not properly used to further the organization's
educational purposes in some manner."" 7 Accordingly, the taxpayer
was entitled to exemption "because it is carrying on an exempt
08
program commensurate in scope with its financial resources."
Similarly, in an early 2000 Letter Ruling, the Service ruled that
an organization formed to give financial assistance to needy women
would not lose exemption from the operation of an unrelated
business (a gift shop and tea room) providing sixty-six percent of
the organization's resources. 0 9 The Service reasoned that an
unrelated business used as a fundraiser for an overall charitable
purpose was operated in furtherance of a charitable purpose and
1 10
did not constitute a substantial nonexempt purpose.
On the other hand, the IRS invoked the commensurate-in-scope
test to deny exempt status in two recent exemption cases, although
ultimately these cases were settled or decided on other grounds.
Both cases, however, could be read as broadly consistent with
the "cross-subsidization" explanation of the "in furtherance of"
requirement of the regulations, since in one case the IRS claimed
that large accumulations of surplus were not being spent on
charitable purposes and in the other argued that all but four
percent of the organization's funds were being paid as fees to
professional fundraisers.' Thus the IRS' own internal view of the
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2000-21-056 (Feb. 8, 2000).
110. Id. ("One way in which a trade or business may be in furtherance of exempt purposes
is to raise money for the exempt purposes of the organization, notwithstanding that the
.actual trade or business activity may be taxable under sections 511 through 513.").
111. In its April 1999 audit of the Kamehameha Schools Bishop Estate (KSBE) in Hawaii,

the IRS apparently raised the issue regarding the taxpayer KSBE's large accumulations of
surplus and lack of expenditures for educational purposes as potential grounds for revoking

tax exemption. The case was never litigated as both the IRS and KSBE executed a closing
agreement on the tax issues. For an in-depth look at the KSBE case and the tax issues
involved, see Brody, supra note 102. About eight years earlier, the IRS wrote an unpublished
Technical Advice Memorandum involving United Cancer Council, Inc. (UCC), which
concluded that UCC had failed the commensurate-in-scope test because only about four
percent of its revenue was used for charitable purposes, the balance having been paid to a
private fundraiser and spent on administrative costs. See 4 EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS TAX
REVIEW 726 (1991) (reprinting the unpublished memorandum). Although UCC's exempt
status ultimately was litigated in Tax Court, the actual litigation did not rely on the
commensurate-in-scope analysis. See United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 109 T.C. 17

(1997); HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 75.
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validity of the commensurate-in-scope doctrine and its application
to the "in furtherance of"test of the regulations is unknown.
In fact, the commensurate-in-scope test could explain many of the
results in the commerciality cases even though the doctrine does
not constitute the stated grounds for decision. Thus the resale shop
cases pass muster under this test because virtually all of the profits
generated by the shops were plowed back into the charitable
operation." 2 Religious publishers such as Scripture Press that
appeared to hoard profits with no expenditures toward significant
charitable activity fail the test," 3 whereas publishers that did
dedicate profits to other significant charitable activities remained
exempt.1 4 But the courts have never officially invoked the
commensurate-in-scope test as an analytical tool in these cases,
and the Service has itself invoked the test only sporadically
(and until recently, only in support of exempt status). Moreover,
the commensurate-in-scope analysis does not explain why the
Third Circuit supported exemption for Presbyterian & Reformed
Publishing, which also hoarded significant profits,1 5 and does
not explain the Eighth Circuit's decision in FederationPharmacy
Services v. Commissionerthat a pharmacy operated at cost for the
poor and elderly (and that was therefore clearly operating
commensurate
in scope with its charitable purpose) was not tax
6
exempt."1
In short, neither the Service nor the courts have developed a
consistent doctrinal approach to measure when commercial activity
by an exempt charity risks its exempt status. Virtually identical
religious publishing operations have been held exempt or not,
seemingly dependent on the mood of the reviewing court. A
pharmacy not operating in a commercial manner is not exempt, but
a hospital operating very much in a commercial manner is granted
exemption without question. Resale shops for the blind and poor are
tax exempt, but benefitting the poor of the Navajo Nation by leasing
oil well drilling equipment is not. "1
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
See Scripture Press, 285 F.2d 800.
See, e.g., A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Comm'r, 32 T.C.M. (P-H) 1623 (1963).
Presbyterian& Reformed Publ'g, 743 F.2d at 148.
Fed'n Pharmacy Servs. v. Comm'r, 625 F.2d 804, 804 (8th Cir. 1980).
Compare the resale cases with Greater United Navajo Dev. Enters. v. Comm'r, 74

514

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:487

In 1971, the Service cautioned its agents against using the
scope of business activity to deny exemption, but even throughout
this period the Service continued to litigate denials of exemption on
commercial activity grounds and officially invoked the commensurate-in-scope test as a tool for denying exempt status in two
instances in the 1990s."' Meanwhile, the courts unwittingly may
be using a sort of commensurate-in-scope analysis in many of the
commerciality cases, but certainly not all of them. Under the
circumstances, the best one can divine from the case law and
rulings is that the less commercial activity an exempt charity has,
the less likely it will face serious exemption problems. The result is
a position that is not a very happy circumstance for the administration of the tax laws, nor one that appears to reflect any wellconsidered underlying public or tax policy approach to the subject.
C. The Effects of Indirect CommercialActivity in Complex
Structures
1. The CorporateSeparate-IdentityRule and the Integral-Part
Test
The problems with assessing the effects of commercial activity on
exempt status extend beyond commercial activities conducted
directly by exempt organizations. In fact, precisely because of the
exemption risks of direct commercial activities, many charities have
adopted complex business structures using separate corporate
subsidiaries in an effort to isolate themselves from the exemption
risks posed by direct commercial activity." 9
T.C. 69 (1980), where the court granted no exemption despite a stated purpose to promote
economic development among the poor of the Navajo Nation where the record showed that
the main business activity was leasing oil drilling equipment and no Navajo were employed
in that activity. The Tax Court held that training of unskilled workers, although charitable,
was "of relatively minimal consequence" on the record. Id. at 82.
118. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
119. See generally HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 5, §§ 9.01-9. 10 (discussing the use of
complex business structures by charities); McGovern, supra note 5, at 1128 ("To survive in
a dramatically changing economy, many section 501(c)(3) organizations began to revise their
corporate structures. The increased use of taxable subsidiary corporations was a part of this
strategy."). A perfect example of this strategy occurred recently when the IRS threatened to
revoke tax exemption for an Internet Service Provider (ISP) which had been formed to
provide "community access" to the Internet. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-03-069 (June 11, 2001).
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The separate-subsidiary strategy relies on a long standing tax
rule developed from the Supreme Court decision in Moline
Properties v. Commissioner12 that the separate existence of a
corporation must be respected for tax purposes, and that activities
of a corporation formed for a valid business purpose cannot be
attributed to the corporation's shareholder. 121 Although Moline
Properties was not a tax-exemption case, the IRS followed the
separate-identity principle in analyzing exempt status. 2 2 In fact,
the Service has repeatedly noted in the charitable context that "the
activities of a separately incorporated subsidiary cannot ordinarily
be attributed to its parent organization unless the facts provide
clear and convincing evidence that the subsidiary is in reality an
arm, agent or integral-part of the parent. This is an evidentiary
123
burden that is not easily overcome."
When the IRS discoveredthat seventy-five percent of the organization's revenues came from
supplying internet service to the public for a fee, it ruled that the ISP failed the primary
purpose test. Id. The case was settled by the ISP agreeing to transfer its profit-making
activities to a controlled for-profit subsidiary, leaving the 'public access" activities in the
parent. Id.; see also Internet Service ProviderRegains Exempt Status by Forming Taxable
Sub, 25 EOTR WEEKLY 17 (Jan. 28, 2002).
120. 319 U.S. 436 (1943).
121. Id. Moline Properties was a corporation that held title to certain real estate, and was
owned by a single shareholder. Id. at 437. When the corporation sold the real estate, it
argued that no corporate-level tax was due on the sale because it was merely an agent or
alter ego of the shareholder. Id. at 440. The Supreme Court held that the tax system must
respect the separate-identity of a corporation formed for a valid business reason, a holding
which in effect protected the integrity of the corporate tax. Id. As noted below in Part III, if
one consciously decides not to protect the corporate tax base by permitting exempt
organizations to capture premium financial returns on direct commercial operations, or ifone
decides to better protect the corporate tax base through application of an expanded UBIT to
business income, there is no policy reason to apply Moline Propertiesto the issue of whether
a complex charitable enterprise is engaged in a charitable purpose. For an extensive
discussion of Moline Propertiesand subsequent cases, see HILLAND KIRSCHTEN,supra note
5, 1 9.01.
122. In 1985, the IRS considered the case of a tax-exempt charity formed to provide
management services to nonprofit hospitals. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,326 (Jan. 17, 1985). When
the organization decided to expand its services to other organizations, including for-profit
businesses, on a for-profit basis, it isolated these expanded activities in a controlled for-profit
subsidiary. Id. The IRS ruled in the Memorandum that the activities of the subsidiary would
not be imputed to the exempt parent under the Moline Propertiesdoctrine. Id.
123. Id. Similarly, in a 1986 private ruling the IRS found that even where the subsidiary's
entire board of directors was made up of directors and employees of the exempt parent, the
separate-identity principle would be observed because "the considerable evidentiary burden
required to show that the taxable subsidiary is in reality an instrumentality of the parent
is not easily overcome." Priv. Ltr. Rul. 87-06-012 (Oct. 31, 1986).
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Just as scholars generally fail to explore the intersection of the
UBIT and exempt status with respect to commercial activity,
scholars also generally fail to recognize that the separate-identity
rule has both "upstream" and "downstream" consequences. On the
"upstream" side, the rule means that business activities of a
controlled subsidiary generally will not be attributed to the corporate parent (or to sibling corporations) in assessing the exempt
status of that parent (or the siblings).124 Thus, an exempt parent
corporation can protect itself from worry about whether commercial
activities jeopardize exempt status by isolating such activities in a
separate subsidiary. This upstream isolation effect is what often
spurs exempt charities to create taxable subsidiaries in order to
isolate the effects of commercial activity (which might well be
subject to the UBIT in any event) on exempt status.
The corporate separate-identity rule, however, also produces a
"downstream" isolation effect. Because of the rule, the charitable
activities of a parent or sibling corporation also generally cannot
be imputed to a controlled subsidiary in order to classify it as
charitable. Current tax doctrine contains one exception to this
downstream isolation rule, the integral-part doctrine, but as
illustrated below, the integral part exception is extremely limited
in its application.
The downstream isolation effect of the separate-identity rule
enjoyed relative obscurity until a famous series of cases in the early
1990s dealing with Geisinger Health Plan (GHP). 25 GHP was a
subsidiary formed by Geisinger Foundation, the exempt parent of
a health care system that operated in Pennsylvania. The Geisinger
system included a number of subsidiary corporations, including
clinics that employed doctors and two exempt hospital subsidiaries.12 GHP's sole purpose in this system was to conduct a
health maintenance organization (HMO) that enrolled members in
Geisinger's service areas.'27 GHP offered no health services to its
124. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39, 326 (Jan. 17, 1985); FISHMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at
828; HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 5, 1 9.02.
125. See Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991) (Geisinger I),
rev'd, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993), remanded to 100 T.C. 394 (1993) (Geisinger II), affd, 30
F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994).

126. Geisinger Health Plan v. Comm'r, 985 F.2d 1210, 1212 (3d. Cir. 1993).
127. Id. at 1213.
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members on its own. Instead, it contracted with other members of
the Geisinger System, including the two subsidiaries
that operated
128
acute-care hospitals, to perform those services.
The Geisinger litigation involved two phases. The first phase
involved the Service's conclusion that GHP standing alone did not
meet the relevant tests of tax exemption-a classic application of
the corporate separate-identity rule. 129 GHP, however, had argued
that even if it did not qualify for tax exemption as a stand-alone
entity, it should be granted exemption because it was an integralpart of the Geisinger Health System, which as a whole met the
community benefit standards for exemption.3 0 Because the Tax
Court had not reached this issue in its original opinion, the Third
Circuit remanded the case for further consideration.
Thus, the second phase of the litigation focused on the
circumstances under which a subsidiary corporation could claim
"derivative" exemption by virtue of its relationship with a parent or
sibling entity. As the Tax Court noted, the "integral part" language
appears as part of the § 502 regulations, the Code section which
denies exemption to feeder organizations. This regulation states, "If
a subsidiary organization ... would itself be exempt on the ground

that its activities are an integral part of the exempt activities of the
parent organization, its exemption will not be lost because ... the

subsidiary derives a profit from its dealings with its parent ..
The regulation further states that a subsidiary is not exempt if its
primary purpose is carrying on a business that would constitute an
unrelated business if conducted by the parent.3 2 As an example of
integral-part exemption, the regulation offers a subsidiary operated
133
for the sole purpose of furnishing electric power to the parent.

128. Id.
129. After the Service denied GHP's application for exempt status, GHP appealed to the
Tax Court, which initially held GHP exempt as a stand-alone entity. Geisinger1, 62 T.C.M.
1656 (1991). The IRS then appealed this decision to the Third Circuit, which reversed the
Tax Court on the grounds that GHP did not meet the relevant "community benefit" test of
exemption for health care providers because it provided little or no free care for the poor and
only limited access to Medicaid patients. GeisingerHealth Plan,985 F.2d at 1219-20.
130. Geisinger Health Plan, 985 F.2d at 1220.
131. Treas. Reg. § 1.502-1(b) (as amended in 1970).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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Prior to Geisinger I, the Service and courts had routinely
approved derivative exemption for corporations that essentially
were "captive" service organizations on the basis of this regulation." 4 Consistent with this approach, the Service's position in
GeisingerII was that in order to qualify for exemption under the
integral-part test, the services performed by a subsidiary of an
exempt parent must be "essential" to the charitable purpose of the
parent, provided only to the exempt parent, and must not be
services that would constitute an unrelated business if carried on
by the parent.135 GHP agreed with the "not an unrelated business"
criterion, but took a broader view of the relationship between
siblings that would support an integral part analysis.3 6 It argued
that as long as the subject organization's activities were undertaken
under the supervision or control of
an exempt parent or sibling, the
7
integral-part test should apply. 1
The Tax Court's opinion avoided the relationship issue; on the
unrelated business issue, it simply found that the record was
insufficient to conclude anything much about whether the HMO at
issue would have been an unrelated business in the hands of one of
the Geisinger System hospitals, and therefore ruled that the
taxpayer had not carried its burden of proof on that issue.1 8
Geisinger appealed the Tax Court's decision on the integral-part
issue to the Third Circuit,3 9 which proceeded to make the integral
part test completely unintelligible. Foregoing the UBIT issue, which
was the basis of the Tax Court's decision, the Third Circuit instead
directly addressed the kind of relationship between affiliated
corporate entities that would support integral-part exemption. 4 0 On
this point, the court stated that a subsidiary could claim integral134. See, e.g., Squire v. Students Book Corp., 191 F.2d 1018 (9th Cir. 1951) (approving
exemption for a university book store); Rev. Rul. 78-41, 1978-1 C.B. 148 (approving
exemption for subsidiary of nonprofit hospital formed to provide self-insurance for
malpractice claims against hospital); Rev. Rul. 63-235,1963-2 C.B. 210 (approving exemption
for incorporated law review association that published law review for a related law school).
See generally HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 552-53 (discussing exemptions for affiliated
organizations).
135. Geisinger 11, 100 T.C. at 402.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 406.
138. Id.
139. Geisinger Health Plan, 30 F.3d at 498.
140. Id. at 501.
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part exemption when "its relationship to its parent somehow
enhances the subsidiary's own exempt character to the point that,
when the boost provided by the parent is added to the contribution
made by the subsidiary itself, the subsidiary would be entitled to
§ 501(c)(3) status.1
Ultimately, in its second consideration of
Geisingerin 1994, the Third Circuit suggested that this "boost" was
lacking because GHP's relationship with the system did nothing to
enhance GHP's own delivery of health services-it did nothing more
by virtue of its relationship with the Geisinger system than it would
142
have done standing alone.
The Geisinger "boost" analysis has been widely and correctly
criticized as inconsistent with a long line of cases and rulings prior
to Geisinger that approved derivative exemption without any
apparent "boost" of any sort, and as offering virtually no doctrinal
guidance for determining what kind of parent/subsidiary or sibling
relationship would support derivative exemption under the integral
-part test. 143 A good indication of the near-universal disdain for the
Third Circuit's opinion in Geisingeris that no subsequent case has
embraced the "boost analysis," and even the IRS has steadfastly
avoided it.
Recently, however, the Tax Court interpreted the "not an unrelated business" aspect of the integral-part analysis in a way that,
in conjunction with the Third Circuit's "boost" analysis, appears to
create a superbly crafted Catch-22 for subsidiary corporations
seeking exemption under the integral-part test. In IHC Care, Inc.
v. Commissioner,'14 the court reviewed the issue of whether a
"contract" model HMO'" similar to that in Geisingercould meet the
integral part analysis.' Unlike GHP, this time the taxpayer (IHC)

141. Id.
142. Id. at 502-03.

143. See, e.g., HOPKINS, supra note 6, at 552-55 (noting inconsistency between "boost"
analysis and prior decisions); DOUGLAS M. MANcINO, TAXATION OF HOSPITALS AND HEALTH
CARE ORGANIZATIONS § 6.02[2] (2001) (declaring the boost test "an incorrect interpretation
of the law ... at variance with virtually every decided case and published ruling").
144. 82 T.C.M. (CCH) 617 (2001).
145. I use the phrase "contract model to refer to a structure in which the HMO does not
actually employ health care professionals directly or directly own health care facilities;
instead, the HMO contracts with doctors and hospitals to provide these services to its
members.
146. IHC Care, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 626.
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had provided evidence regarding its member services, so that the
integral-part issue could not be disposed of on the basis of the
taxpayer's failure to carry its burden of proof."7 Thus, presented
squarely with the integral-part issue, the Tax Court held that the
IHC HMO could not meet the integral-part test because it provided
substantial services to its members via contracts with doctors who
were not employees of IHC's exempt sibling entities." 8 These
services were not essential to the exempt entities, and according to
the court, therefore not "substantially related" to the exempt
purposes of IHC's sibling corporations. Hence, the court concluded
that IHC could not pass the "not an unrelated business in the hands
of the exempt parent" prong of the integral-part test."9
This analysis seems to prohibit integral-part exemption when a
subsidiary corporation provides services beyond its sibling group on
the grounds that such "beyond the group" services would be an
unrelated business. But the Third Circuit in Geisingerseem to say
that without evidence of some additional services resulting from the
relationship between the exempt sibling and the corporation
seeking derivative exemption (e.g., the "boost"), integral-part
exemption also is unavailable. This "damned if you do; damned if
you don't" state of the current law means, in turn, that the integralpart test probably limits derivative exemption to a very narrow
class of captive service organizations already approved by the IRS
via past precedents. In any event, the integral-part test as currently
interpreted provides no general path for siblings to claim derivative
exemption, and makes the "downstream" isolation effect of current
law impenetrable in all but a very narrow class of captive service
subsidiaries.
The lack of any general method for a noncaptive service
subsidiary to escape the downstream isolation effect of the corporate separate-identity rule can potentially create some bizarre
differences in the tax treatment of commercial activities depending
on whether such activities are conducted as a "division" of an
exempt parent or in a separate subsidiary. If a particular
147. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
148. IHC Care, 82 T.C.M. (CCH) at 626. The court noted that eighty percent of the
physician services provided to IHC members came from doctors not employed by IHCaffiliated exempt entities. Id.
149. Id.

20021

CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION

521

commercial activity is conducted as a division and considered
substantially related to the charitable purpose of the parent, then
the revenues from the commercial activity are wholly untaxed.
The same commercial activity in a separate subsidiary, however,

triggers the downstream isolation effects of the corporate separateidentity rule, causing the subsidiary to be fully taxable. Because the
activity itself is not charitable, the only hope for the subsidiary is
to qualify for derivative exemption under the integral-part analysis,
which, as noted above, is virtually impossible given current interpretations of that doctrine. 50
2. The PartnershipAttribution Rule

Another disconcerting bump in the commerciality analysis is that
partnerships are treated completely opposite to corporations in
150. As an example, assume that an exempt hospital operates an outpatient surgery
facility. If operated as a division of the hospital, such a facility has no effect on exempt status
and is not subject to the UBIT. Priv. Ltr. RUl. 2001-17-041 (Jan. 29, 2001). If conducted in
a separate corporate subsidiary, however, it is not clear that such a facility would be entitled
to tax exemption standing alone. Particularly if the subsidiary did not provide free care to
the poor or treat significant numbers of Medicaid patients, the subsidiary might not meet the
community benefit tests of exemption applicable to health care providers (much as the
Geisinger HMO did not meet them on a stand-alone basis). See supra note 129 and
accompanying text; see also Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), affd,
242 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a subsidiary of an exempt parent that was a
partner with a for-profit entity in an outpatient surgery clinic was not tax exempt).
This potential inconsistency was highlighted in a somewhat different way by the IRS in
1990. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,830 (Aug. 30, 1990). Issued in 1990 prior to the Geisinger
litigation, this Memorandum previewed the Service's position in Geisinger, analyzing
whether a contract-model HMO that was part of a large health care system could be exempt
under the integral-part theory and noting that the IRS had ruled earlier that the HMO could
not separately qualify for tax exemption. Id. In the course of its analysis, the Service found
that the HMO could not meet the integral part test because it would provide services beyond
"captive" services to the parent corporation. Id. The Service also opined that the HMO would
fail the "unrelated business" portion of the test because of the historic IRS position that any
services or products that a hospital provides to persons other than patients constitute an
unrelated business. Id. Therefore, according to this analysis, the HMO would be an unrelated
business in the hands of its exempt-hospital sibling because it would provide services to
people who would not necessarily be patients of the hospital. In a footnote, however, the IRS
conceded that "as a practical matter, a hospital probably would not pay the unrelated
business income tax on revenues from an HMO operated as a division of the hospital ...
because the HMO activities would be described in section 501(c)(4)." Id. The IRS recognized
at the end of the Memorandum that "the result in this case may appear to some as the
elevation of form over substance," but opined that the choice of a particular business entity
"involves both advantages and disadvantages from a tax standpoint." Id.
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assessing the effects of commercial activity. Unlike the corporate
separate-identity rule, which provides both upstream and
downstream isolation for commercial activities, the IRS has ruled
that partners in a partnership are deemed to be in the underlying
business of the partnership for exemption purposes.'' This rule,
based on the aggregate theory of partnership operations, 15 2 applies
whether the partner is a general or limited partner, and also
applies to members of a limited liability company that has chosen
to be taxed as a partnership.'" Like the corporate separate-identity
rule, the attribution rule
for partnerships developed outside the
5
4
context.1
tax-exemption
In assessing charitable status, the attribution rule for partnerships means that an exempt entity that is a partner will be
deemed to be in the business of the partnership. The effects of that
business on exempt status presumably would be analyzed in the
same manner as if the business were conducted by the exempt
entity directly-that is, the charitable partner would be at the
mercy of the commerciality doctrine and its virtually undefined
intersection with the UBIT and, possibly, the commensurate-inscope test. The attribution rule also means, however, that
partnership activities should not suffer from the downstream
isolation effects of the corporate separate-identity rule-that is,
151. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 720-21; see also Mary Jo Salins et al., Whole
Hospital Joint Ventures, in INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION (CPE) TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL

YEAR 2002, at 13 (2001), availableat http:/www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utlltopica.pdf (last visited
Sept. 13, 2002); Rochelle Korman & Dahlia Balsam, Joint Ventures With For-ProfitsAfter
Rev. Rul. 98-15, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 441 (2000).
152. The aggregate theory states that a partnership is simply an aggregate of its
individual partners. See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM S. MCKEE ET AL., FEDERAL TAXATION OF

PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 1.02, at 1-6 (3d ed. 2001).
153. Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718,720-21; Salins et al., supra note 151 at 13; Korman
& Balsam, supra note 151, at 441.
154. See Butler v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 1097, 1106 (1961) (holding that a partner in a
partnership was engaged in the business of the partnership and therefore qualified for bad-

debt deduction: "By reason of being a partner in a business petitioner was individually
engaged in business") (quoting Ward v. Comm'r, 20 T.C. 332,343 (1953), affd, 224 F.2d 547
(9th Cir. 1955)). United States taxation principles relating to international businesses and
individuals also hold that partners are engaged in the business of the partnership for
purposes of determining U.S. source income. I.R.C. § 875 (2000). For a general discussion of
the "aggregate versus entity" tension in partnership taxation, see MCKEE ET AL., supra note
152, 1 1.02, at 1-6 to 1-9; ARTHUR B. WILLIS ET. AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 1.04, at 1-62

to 1-68 (2001).

20021

CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION

523

partnership activities might well escape taxation in certain circumstances because, in the context of the overall operations of
the exempt partner, the partnership activity might be considered
substantially related155 under UBIT precedents and thus escape
taxation completely.
In any event, the aggregation rule for partnerships produces
significantly different risks and benefits with respect to tax-exempt
status for an exempt parent organization than the corporate
separate-identity rule. Because both rules were simply adopted
wholesale from tax law developed in cases not dealing with taxexempt status, however, neither the IRS nor the courts have
ever addressed whether these rules make sense in the context
of assessing tax-exempt status for individual components of a
charitable enterprise.
D. Summary
The amalgamation of the commerciality doctrine, the UBIT, the
"corporate separate-identity" rule and the "partnership attribution"
rule has produced doctrinal confusion and contradictory results
with respect to commercial activity by exempt charities. On the
one hand, the commerciality doctrine holds that a charitable
entity directly conducting commercial activities may jeopardize its
exempt status.156 Because the IRS views partners as engaged in the
business activities of a partnership,'5 7 this same risk to exemption
results when a charitable organization is involved in commercial
activities as a partner or member of a limited liability company
taxed as a partnership. Determining exactly what commercial
activities produce this risk is, however, exceedingly difficult. The
analysis appears to depend first, on whether a given commercial
activity would be considered "related" under the UBIT (a question
that presents its own doctrinal problems); second, if not related, on
155. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-17-041 (Jan. 29, 2001) (holding that an ambulatory

surgery facility operated in joint venture between two exempt hospitals did not affect exempt
status of partners and was not subject to UBIT). See generally John D. Colombo, A
Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects of Joint Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG.

TAX REV. 187 (2001) (discussing the application of the IRS exemption analysis to joint
ventures).
156. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

157. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
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how "substantial" an unrelated activity is with respect to an
organization's charitable activities; and, perhaps, third, whether
the organization can prove it is spending revenues from substantial
commercial activities on "legitimate" charitable
activities, thus
158
meeting the commensurate-in-scope test.
In order to escape this doctrinal uncertainty, and the accompanying terror of potentially losing exempt status, charitable
organizations have taken refuge in the upstream isolation of the
corporate separate-identity rule, using separate subsidiaries to
conduct business activities that may pose a risk to exempt status. 159
The separate-identity rule itself, however, creates inconsistencies
because the downstream isolation effect of the rule means that
activities that one might logically want to conduct in a separate
subsidiary for business reasons, such as limited liability or
regulatory issues, could end up being taxable in situations where
those same activities conducted by an exempt parent or sibling,
might well qualify for exempt status. 6 0 The next Part of this Article
examines the current rules in light of both public policy and tax
policy concerns that might surround commercial activity by exempt
organizations.
II. WHY Do WE CARE? PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS REGARDING

COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY
Given the current inconsistencies in the tax rules governing
commercial activity by charitable organizations, we should begin
evaluating these rules by parsing the public policy concerns that
may underlie regulating commercial activities by charities. The
question at its core is simple: Why should we be concerned about
the apparently growing tendency of exempt charities to engage in
a variety of commercial activities either directly or through related
business entities?

158. See supra Part I.B.
159. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 125-50 and accompanying text.
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A. Why Do Exempt CharitiesEngage in CommercialActivities?
A useful predicate to examining the public policy concerns raised
by commercial activity of exempt charities is to ask why charities
engage in direct commercial activities at all. Charities, after all,
have a specific charitable mission not directed toward profit
maximization, which empirical evidence indicates is taken seriously
by nonprofit managers."' Exempt charities also must, by law, be
nonprofit organizations,1 62 which means they cannot have shareholders or owners with an equity stake in the enterprise concerned
about profit maximization.' 6 3 So why do they engage in direct
commercial activities-as opposed to passively investing excess
capital-to begin with?
There are at least three answers to this question. The first is
that because of the breadth of the definition of "charitable" in
§ 501(c)(3), 164 certain commercial activities are themselves considered charitable activities. To take the most prominent example,
a nonprofit hospital that essentially conducts a fee-for-service
business of providing health care services is nevertheless exempt
under § 501(c)(3) as long as it provides those services to a large
enough segment of the community to constitute a "community
benefit." 6 5 In Presbyterianand Reformed Publishing, the Third
Circuit likewise concluded that a commercial publishing business
could be an exempt charitable activity if limited to religious

161. See Weisbrod, supra note 2, at 287, 295 (citing the example of zoos and public
television that appear to consciously adopt policies contrary to profit maximization because
they view profit maximization as inconsistent with their charitable missions).
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(cX2) (2001).
163. As noted earlier, nonprofit organizations are not prohibited from making a profit in
the sense of having a net accounting surplus; instead, the "nonprofit" prohibition relates to
the universal rule that such profits cannot be distributed to owners or "insiders" of the
organization. Henry Hansmann calls this the "nondistribution constraint." See supranote
22 and accompanying text.
164. I.R.C. § 501(cX3) (2000).
165. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117, 118. See generally Mark A. Hall & John
D. Colombo, The CharitableStatus ofNonprofitHospitals:Toward a Donative Theory of Tax
Exemption, 66 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1991) (proposing a donative theory of tax exemption
whereby public support for an institution indicates its value to the community, thus making

it worthy of a tax subsidy).
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materials, presumably because "religious" organizations are exempt
166
under § 501(c)(3).
In the majority of situations, however, an exempt charity carries
on a noncommercial charitable mission. The Red Cross, for
example, provides disaster relief, a decidedly noncommercial
activity. In these cases, then, the reasons an exempt charity would
engage in direct commercial activity are grounded in two different
financial considerations. Consider first that an exempt charity has
essentially two choices when making an investment to produce
revenue. The first choice is to passively invest excess capital,
perhaps from endowments, in either equity securities or debt. The
second choice would be to invest the excess capital in a direct
commercial enterprise. If the financial returns on both choices
were equal, charities presumably would be indifferent from a
financial perspective about whether to invest passively or operate
a commercial business. 1 ' Moreover, given the fact that both
charitable managers and their donor constituents may consider the
operation of a commercial activity contrary to the charitable
mission, there is every reason to believe that in a scenario of
68
financial indifference, a charity will prefer a passive investment.
Thus, one can assume that a charity will choose to operate a
commercial activity directly only when the financial returns from
such activity involve a premium over what the charity could earn
on a passive investment.
There are two ways in which such a premium can result. The
first is in a situation in which the charity enjoys what economists
sometimes refer to as "economies of scope. " 169 That is, exempt
charities may have excess capacity from capital investments made
to pursue their charitable mission that can be used to produce
commercial revenues at costs below those incurred by for-profit

166. Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148, 153 (3d Cir. 1982); see
supranotes 56-60 and accompanying text.
167. See Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1028 n.33 (discussing the relevance of a
hypothetical tax imposed on commercial business activities and not on passive investments).
168. See Joseph J. Cordes & Burton A. Weisbrod, Differential Taxationof Nonprofits and
the Commercializationof Nonprofit Revenues, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note
1, at 83, 85-87.

169. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 626-27 (discussing economies of scope in the context
of nonprofit organizations).
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firms. 7 0 A classic example of this is a college athletic stadium. Once
a university has invested in building the stadium as part of its
educational mission,"'7 there is essentially zero marginal cost to the
university associated with leasing that stadium to a professional
football team for summer athletic practices. Leasing unused
supercomputer time is another example of a situation in which an
exempt charity could exploit an 1economy
of scope to earn a premium
72
return on its sunk investment.
Even if no economies of scope exist, however, current tax policy
can provide an exempt charity with a premium economic return
from the direct operation of a commercial activity because of the
corporate tax system. The existence of the corporate tax means that
in corporate commercial enterprises, taxes are paid twice on an
equity investment: once at the entity level at the corporate tax
rate (currently a maximum of 36%) and then again as income
from the corporate business is distributed to shareholders (at a
current maximum rate of 39.1%). 17" On the other hand, income
from proprietorships or "pass-through" entities such as partnerships is taxed only once, at the individual tax rate. 174 Similarly,
because interest payments on debt are deductible business expenses
under the Code, 175 there is no corporate-level tax on the earnings a
corporation uses to pay interest; thus, an investor's return on
corporate debt effectively is taxed only at the individual level. The
double-taxation on equity investment inherent in the corporate
form means that the tax rate on a dollar invested as equity in a
corporate enterprise is roughly 60%, as opposed to the roughly 40%
rate applicable to single-taxed investments. In order for corporate
equity to be an attractive investment, therefore, a dollar invested
in corporate equity must earn a higher rate of return pre-tax than
170. Id.
171. Though whether intercollegiate athletics ought to be considered a charitable activity
can be debated. See, e.g., Richard L. Kaplan, IntercollegiateAthletics and the Unrelated
Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430 (1980).
172. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 627. Note that the assumption here is that it would
be costly, ifnot impossible, for the charity to convert the excess capacity into cash that could
then be invested directly. As Rose-Ackerman noted, once capital is in place, investment
.choices are limited." Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1025 n.29.
173. I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (2000).
174. MCKEE ETAL., supra note 152,
175. I.R.C. § 163 (2000).

9.01[1).
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a dollar invested in a single-tax enterprise
or corporate bonds, so
76
that after-tax returns are similar.1
If there were no corporate-level tax, then a charitable enterprise
would have no financial incentive to engage in direct commercial
activities-other than in the excess-capacity situation described
above-because capital markets presumably would equalize investment returns on all capital. 177 With the existence of the corporatelevel tax, however, a nonprofit organization can "capture" a
premium financial return-essentially the amount the capital
markets require to equalize returns on capital in corporate and
unincorporated businesses or between corporate equity and debtif it can conduct a business directly and avoid the corporate tax
that otherwise would have to be paid. 178 This income tax premium
is compounded if the nonprofit also can escape state property
taxation. 179 Exempt charities presumably seek such premium
returns in order to enhance the revenue available to spend on their
charitable mission. As a result, our system currently can provide a
substantial incentive for an exempt organization to operate a
176. Assume, for example, that one can earn $10 on a $100 investment (10%) pretax on
either an equity investment in a corporation (e.g., stock) or in a proprietorship. At the
maximum tax rates currently in effect, the $10 pre-tax return on the proprietorship results
in approximately a $6 (6%) return after-tax on that investment (the $10 pre-tax return less
the $4 personal income tax due at our approximately 40% rate). In the corporate investment,
however, the $10 pretax return is first reduced to $6.50 by the corporate level tax; the
shareholder then owes another 40% personal income tax on this $6.50, reducing the pretax
return to $3.90. Thus the 10% pretax return in the double-tax corporate world ends up as a
3.9% return. This example illustrates that the effective tax rate on earnings relating to
corporate equity is roughly 61%. Corporate businesses, therefore, presumably must earn a
premium return on equity to attract investors-in my example, the corporate investment
would need to return roughly $15.40 (15.4%) in order to produce the same after tax return
as the proprietorship.
Because interest payments are deductions from taxable income under I.R.C. § 163 (2000),
no entity-level tax is paid on the income earned to make an interest payment to a corporate
bond-holder. That is, a corporation that earns $10 and pays it to an investor as interest has
a $10 deduction under § 163, and therefore has zero taxable income and no tax liability. Thus
a corporate bond, like an equity investment in a proprietorship or partnership, is a singletaxed investment and does not suffer from the double tax applied to corporate equity
investments.
177. See Cordes & Weisbrod, supra note 168, at 88-90.
178. See id.; see also Hansmann, supra note 13, at 610 ("The more compelling view ... is
that the corporate income tax does affect the cost of capital at the margin and that,
everything else being equal, tax-exempt corporations have higher rates of return on
investment than those of taxable firms.").
179. See Cordes & Weisbrod, supra note 168, at 89.
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commercial enterprise directly, as opposed to simply being a passive
investor, if the direct commercial activity would escape the
corporate-level tax in the exempt organization's hands.
To summarize, the major reasons for an exempt organization to
conduct commercial activities directly, as opposed to being simply
a passive investor, are first, that the commercial activity is itself
the raison d'etre for the charitable organization (e.g., the nonprofit
hospital); second, that the exempt organization can exploit excess
capacity; and third, that the charitable organization might be able
to capture a premium financial return even outside the excess
capacity situation by avoiding the corporate income tax. The next
issue, therefore, is whether legitimate public policy concerns exist
with respect to exempt charities engaging in commercial activities
on any of these fronts, and how, if at all, our current rules address
such concerns.
B. Policy Concerns with CommercialActivities
1. TraditionalPolicy Concerns: Unfair Competition and
Erosionof the Corporate Tax Base
As noted in Part I, the traditional policy concerns with direct
commercial activity by exempt charities centered on the potential
for unfair competition with for-profit providers of the same goods
or services, and the potential for a significant impairment of
the corporate tax base."8 Unfair competition, in particular, was a
major theme that led to the enactment of the UBIT in 1950.181
We should recognize a difference, however, between "unwanted"
competition and "unfair" competition. Any time a charity competes
in the marketplace with a for-profit provider, such competition
might be unwanted. Small businesses, in particular, are often the
most vocal adherents to the notion that any competition by an
exempt organization is necessarily bad. 82 The issue, however, is not
competition per se; rather, "unfair" competition presupposes that
the exempt organization is somehow unfairly using the economic
180. See supratext accompanying notes 34-35.
181. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, at 36-37 (1950); S. REP. No. 2375, at 28-29 (1950); Dale, supra
note 13, § 9.02, at 9-7; Hansmann, supra note 13, at 613; Sharpe, supra note 13, at 385-86.
182. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 605; Sharpe, supra note 13, at 450-51.
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benefits of exemption to subsidize their commercial activities. An
example would be a sort of "predatory pricing" in which an exempt
organization prices its product below its competitors because it
does not have to recoup the costs of taxation.183 Less evil-sounding,
but still of significant concern, is the possibility that an exempt
organization will unfairly expand market share by using its tax
savings to reinvest in its commercial activity, thus expanding the
activity with a source of money 8(tax
exemption) unavailable to
4
nonexempt for-profit competitors.

If unfair competition is defined in these traditional terms-such
as predatory pricing or subsidized market expansion-then there
is a significant question as to whether unfair competition is a valid
policy concern at all. In fact, legal academics and economists who
have examined the issue have reached an almost remarkable
consensus that unfair competition in the form of predatory pricing
or predatory market expansion simply is not a serious policy
concern. 8 r As these commentators have observed, if one assumes
that exempt organizations engage in direct commercial activities
in order to capture the financial premium discussed above, then
no incentive exists for exempt organizations to cut prices in order
to maximize market share, in fact, just the opposite is true.' 8
Similarly, there is little incentive for these organizations to
subsidize the expansion of commercial activities with the tax
savings incurred by exemption;.8 7 presumably, these funds also
would be earmarked for expenditure on charitable activities. Thus
even though unfair competition was the primary rationale for
enacting the UBIT, it in fact may not be a very serious policy
concern in practice.'
183. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 610.
184. See Sharpe, supra note 13, at 385-86.
185. See Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption ofNonprofit Organizations
from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 318-25 (1976); Hansmann, supra note 13,
at 613; Klein, supra note 13, at 61-68; Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1036-39; Steinberg,
supra note 13, at 354-55.
186. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 610-12; Klein, supranote 13, at 62; Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 13, at 1024 ("Nonprofit firms engage in tax-exempt business activity to provide
funds to subsidize their primary activities. Therefore they want to maximize expected
profits."); Steinberg, supra note 13, at 362 n.7.
187. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 610-11; Klein, supranote 13, at 65; Rose-Ackerman,
supra note 13, at 1029; Steinberg, supra note 13, at 354-55.
188. Note that there may be economic distortions resulting from having exempt charities
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Even if unfair competition is a serious policy concern, however,
the UBIT standing alone is a very imperfect mechanism for controlling it. In fact, because Congress chose to draw the taxing line
at "related" versus "unrelated" activities, the UBIT does not require
any showing that the commercial activity involved competes with
for-profit providers at all.'8 9 Moreover, the relatedness test leaves
a very large swath of "related" activities exempt from taxation. 90
Hospitals, for example, can sell pharmaceuticals and medical
equipment to outpatients fully capable of patronizing a for-profit
pharmacy without running afoul of the UBIT. 19 ' A bit of tax
planning, moreover, can go a long way in converting what might
look like an unrelated activity into a related one. To take a fanciful
hypothetical, one suspects that if New York University's law school
implemented clinical legal education offerings related to being
corporate legal counsel, and directly operated Mueller Macaroni as
a clinical or externship placement vehicle for students,1 92such a
business would no longer be "unrelated" under the UBIT.

enter a market previously populated only by for-profit firms. Specifically, because such
exempt charities do not pay income taxes, they might find entry into a particular market
cost-effective even if for-profit firms do not. This market entry could result in depressed
prices as a result of oversupply and result in bankruptcies of for-profit firms that would not
occur in the absence of such entry. See, e.g., Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1026-30;
Steinberg, supra note 13, at 356-57. I view this issue as an economic efficiency argument,
however, and not a traditional unfair competition complaint, at least as the unfair concept
was viewed by Congress. For a discussion of economic efficiency concerns regarding
commercial activity by exempt charities, see infra Part II.B.2.
189. See Dale, supra note 18, § 9.04[11].
190. See Weisbrod, supra note 2, at 290; Hansmann, supra note 13, at 628-29; Sharpe,
supra note 13, at 427-43.
191. See Rev. Rul. 78-435, 1978-2 C.B. 181 (stating that the sale of hearing aids to
outpatients was not an unrelated business). See generally THOMAS I. HYATT & BRUCE R.
HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS 447-49 (2d ed. 2001)
(discussing the analytical framework employed by the IRS in concluding sales of
pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and other medical services is allowable under UBIT);
MANCINO, supra note 143, at 15-37 to 15-38 (2001) (explaining case law treatment of
pharmaceutical and medical supply sales by exempt hospitals).
192. Cf Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(dX4) (as amended in 1983) (stating that admission charges
for performances by students of performing arts school are not unrelated business income);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-40-072 (July, 1978) (holding that proceeds generated by college through
operation of professional repertory theater open to general public were not unrelated
income).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:487

Like unfair competition, tax base protection was another major
concern of Congress when it enacted the UBIT in 1950.19 Moreover,
as with unfair competition, the UBIT does a relatively poor job of
tax base protection for similar reasons. First, the large swath of
"related" activities are not taxed at all. Because of the inherent
doctrinal difficulties of defining "related" versus "unrelated"
activities, many profit-producing commercial activities are excluded
from the operation of the UBIT because they plausibly can be
classified as "related" activities.'94 Second, many profit-producing
activities are specifically excepted from the UBIT even though one
would consider them "unrelated." 95 Third, even when a commercial
activity clearly passes into the "unrelated," and therefore taxable,
realm, recent empirical evidence indicates that charities can and do
strategically allocate deductible business expenses and depreciation
disproportionately to "unrelated" business activities in order to
reduce or eliminate the actual tax liability on "unrelated" activities
that they conduct directly.'96
What is interesting about the current rules regarding commercial
activity by exempt charities is that although the UBIT alone is an
imperfect way to address tax base erosion and, to the extent it is a
legitimate concern at all, unfair competition, the addition of the
commerciality doctrine and the corporate separate-identity rule to
193. H.R. REP. No. 2319, at 39 (1950); Dale, supra note 13, § 9.02, at 9-5; Sharpe, supra
note 13, at 393.
194. See Copeland & Rudney, supra note 38, at 750-51 (noting the many business
activities considered"related" under current law); Cordes & Weisbrod, supranote 168, at 85
("In practice, however, it has proved administratively difficult for federal, state, and local

taxing authorities to differentiate taxable and nontaxable commercial activities.");
Hansmann, supra note 13, at 628-29 ("Because the definitions of exempt functions and the
reasons for exempting them have always been vague, and because what it means to be
'related' has never been spelled out well, administration of this standard has not been
simple.").
195. My all time favorite is the specific exception in § 513(f) for profits from bingo games,
but the addition of corporate sponsorship revenues to the "excluded" list in § 513(i) may have

taken over first place. I.R.C. § 513(f) & (i) (2000).
196. See Cordes & Weisbrod, supra note 168, at 97-100; Robert J. Yetman, Tax-Motivated
Expense Allocations by Nonprofit Organizations,76 ACCT. REV. 297, 298 (noting that while

nonprofits as a whole reported $1 billion in losses on revenues of $4 billion with respect to
taxable activities, they reported profits of "$50 billion on their tax-exempt activities").
Yetman's analysis suggests that medical and educational organizations, in particular, engage

in "creative" expense allocation to reduce unrelated taxable income. Id.

20021

0CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION

533

this mix does a much better job with respect to these policy
concerns; albeit in a very backhanded way. Because of the in
terrorem effect of the commerciality doctrine and the lack of
doctrinal clarity concerning when commercial activities place
exemption at risk, the current rules, provide a counterbalance to
charities taking aggressive positions that a particular activity is
"related" to its charitable purpose and therefore not subject to tax.
As the consequences of being wrong with respect to whether
commercial activity will endanger exemption are so dire, and the
doctrinal line so hazy, exempt organization managers must balance
the risk of losing exemption against the premium economic returns
that might be captured by directly conducting commercial activity.
Thus, current doctrine pressures charities to confine these activities
to separate corporate containers, where they will be isolated
under the Moline Properties separate-identity rule, even if these
activities arguably might be "related" and therefore not subject to
tax. Once isolated in this manner, the downstream isolation effect
of Moline Properties means that these activities almost always
will fail to qualify on their own for tax exemption. Moreover, once
these activities are isolated in a separate container, the ploy of
disproportionately allocating operational expenses to commercial
activities subject to UBIT in order to reduce or eliminate the
actual tax paid becomes much more difficult. Thus, in this odd
way the combination of the comnmerciality doctrine and the Moline
Propertiesseparate-identity rule helps protect the integrity of the
corporate tax base by providing a counterbalancing incentive to the
financial premium that might otherwise be captured by directly
conducting a commercial activity. By isolating these activities in
taxable containers, these rules also help protect against potential
unfair competition, if it exists at all.
Using doctrinal uncertainty to enforce tax policy, however, does
not seem to be the best method to inspire confidence that the tax
system is properly achieving its policy goals. In essence, these rules
leave charities at the whim of the zealousness of IRS enforcement
and the pliability, or lack of understanding, of reviewing courts
with respect to the key UBIT concept of relatedness. If we really do
believe that we need to protect for-profit providers or the corporate
tax base from potential encroachment by exempt organizations,
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then surely there is a better way to do so than relying on doctrinal
uncertainty and managerial risk aversion to force the issue.
2. Other Policy Concerns
a. The DiversionProblem
Though the twin tax policy concerns of unfair competition and
tax-base erosion have generally ruled public debate about the
commercial activities of exempt charities, researchers outside the
legal field have noted other policy concerns as well. One common
non-tax theme regarding commercial activity discussed in the social
science literature is what I will label the "diversion" problem. This
argument views commercial activity by nonprofits as inherently
bad because it diverts the attention of managers and resources
away from the core charitable mission and core charitable outputs.
For example, the National Geographic Society's recent internal
reorganization may have resulted in greater emphasis on profitable
activities such as cable television partnerships and documentary
films at the expense of field research.197 Similarly, a school that
makes a decision to sell its services in the form of tuition charges
runs the risk of pricing its target audience out of the market;
museums and zoos charging admission fees may do the same. 9 '
Another similar concern is that commercial activity will displace
core values of "altruism, pluralism and community,"'99 and that
charities will turn to a new set of managers that "may be equally
likely as for-profit managers to cheat the consumer or donor with
respect to output characteristics that are not readily observable. In
effect, true nonprofits may be turned into 'for-profits in disguise' as
a result of the managerial selection process."200 Accordingly, under
the diversion rationale, commercial activity should be minimized
to keep the charitable managers' "eyes on the ball" of providing
only truly charitable services. At its base, the diversion rationale
197. Weisbrod, supra note 2, at 294.
198. Id. at 294-95.
199. Janne Gallagher, PeddlingProducts: The Need to Limit Commercial Behavior by
Nonprofit Organizations,12 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REv. 1007, 1014 (1995).
200. Estelle James, Commercialism Among Nonprofits: Objectives, Opportunities,and
Constraints,in To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 1, at 271, 281.
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assumes the existence of core differences between a firm focused on
a charitable mission and a for-profit firm, and that permitting a
charitable organization to engage in extensive commercial activity
will erode such core differences over time.2 °1
The counterargument to the diversion rationale, of course, is that
increased commercial activity by charities confers significant
benefits on society.21 2 At the very least, this activity provides
additional revenue sources for charities to utilize in executing
their charitable mission.203 On a broader scale, certain kinds of
commercial activity by charities might even be economically
efficient and produce better outputs than the private sector,
government, or nonprofits could produce standing alone. As Burton
Weisbrod observed:
We have found evidence of significant scientific advances
resulting from cooperation between universities and privatesector firms .... We have also found evidence, in the higher-

education, hospital, and museum industries, that increased
commercialism in the form of unrelated business activity is
efficient in the sense that it imposes little marginal cost, given
the resources already available for production of mission-related
activities ...; thus, it would appear to be inefficient to discourage,
let alone prohibit, use of those resources even for business
activities that are unrelated to tax-exempt missions.2'
Finally, it appears that managers of charitable entities view
their charitable mission as a concrete limitation on the scope of
commercial activity. Empirical research, for example, indicates
that many charitable organizations do not undertake profitmaximizing strategies where it would make pure economic sense to
201. See Burton A. Weisbrod, Modeling the Nonprofit Organizationas a Multiproduct
Firm:A Framework for Choice, in TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT, supra note 1, at 47, 54.
Whether such core differences exist is a matter of some debate. Several years ago, Professor
Evelyn Brody opined that there is not much practical difference in economic constraints on
for-profit and nonprofit management and that, at least from an economic perspective, one
might expect that management styles would ultimately converge. Evelyn Brody, Agents
Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit
OrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 460 (1996).
202. Weisbrod, supranote 2, at 288.
203. James, supra note 200, at 281.
204. Weisbrod, supra note 2, at 288.
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do so because such managers view profit maximization as
inconsistent with underlying charitable goals.2 °5 "[In at least some
industries, such as zoos and public television, it seems clear that
admission fees and sale of broadcast airtime are intentionally
restricted because of a sense that generating more revenue from
those sources would be inconsistent with [sic] mission."26 Thus, the
risks of diversion posed by commercial activity may be fewer than
one might imagine, at least where commercial revenues support
preferred charitable outputs and the sense of charitable mission is
strong. We must also assume that no diversion problem exists in
the case of a charity pursuing a commercial activity that itself
is considered charitable. In such a case there is by definition no
"diversion" of charitable mission; instead, the issue is simply
whether the activity itself should be considered charitable.
Initially, one might view the diversion rationale as supporting
the current scope of the commerciality rules. For example, the
diversion rationale might explain why the UBIT is limited solely to
"unrelated" activities. Under this rationale, related commercial
activities are an extension of the organization's charitable mission,
thus management diversion toward such activities is less a
problem than with unrelated activities. The diversion rationale
also explains the necessity for the commerciality doctrine. In
essence, this doctrine is the final backup rule to guard against
granting exemption to an entity that had essentially become a "forprofit in disguise."20' When a nonprofit's commercial activity
becomes indistinguishable from that of a for-profit provider, then
there is no longer any charitable mission deserving of subsidy, and
exemption should be revoked. Moreover, the in terrorem effect of
the commerciality doctrine coupled with the corporate separateidentity rule pressures exempt organizations to conduct unrelated commercial activities in separate subsidiaries, presumably
isolated from the daily concerns of the managers of the parent
charitable enterprise. Finally, a concept akin to the commensuratein-scope doctrine would help the IRS ensure commercial activities
are undertaken primarily to cross-subsidize charitable activities.
205. See Weisbrod, supra note 201, at 47-64.
206. Weisbrod, supra note 2, at 295.
207. See supranote 6 and accompanying text.
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Adoption of such a concept would recognize that public benefit
may result from cross-subsidization, but not in the operation of
commercial activities as ends unto themselves.
These initial impressions regarding the propriety of the current
legal rules governing commercial activity, however, turn out to be
weak on close inspection. In fact, the diffuse nature of charitable
missions makes it difficult to distinguish "related" from "unrelated"
activities so that whatever constraint the UBIT imposes on
diversionary activities is quite limited in practice.2"' Although the
commerciality doctrine might provide some protection from
egregious cases of "for-profits in disguise," the doctrine in fact
provides little guidance for the hard cases such as the religious
publishing or nonprofit hospitals cases, in which the core issue is
whether the underlying activity should be considered charitable.209
Moreover, even if commercial activities are confined to controlled
subsidiaries to avoid the potential exemption effects on the parent,
there is reason to question how much such a structure protects
against the diversion hypothesis. This question arises from consideration of the practical dynamics of the parent-subsidiary
relationship. Controlled subsidiaries are essentially run by the
parent in that management is selected by the parent. Based on this
fact, and because of the importance of the financial success of the
subsidiary to the parent, one can expect that as much or as little
diversion of charitable mission will result whether the nonprofit
conducts the business operations itself or through a controlled
subsidiary. 20 Finally, the Service's own indecision regarding how
and when to employ the commensurate-in-scope test has rendered
that test less effective than it might be in ensuring cross-

208. Weisbrod, supranote 2, at 290; Hansmann, supranote 13, at 628-29. For an extended
discussion of the difficulties of applying the relatedness test, see Sharpe, supranote 13, at
427-50.
209. See supra notes 44-73, 125-42, and accompanying text (discussing the religious
publishing and Geisinger Health Plan cases).
210. The managerial "closeness" between a parent and controlled subsidiary in the world
ofexempt organizations is well-illustrated by Priv. Ltr.Rul. 87-06-012 (Oct. 31, 1986). In that
case, the IRS considered the application of the corporate separate-identity principle to a
subsidiary whose entire board of directors was made up of directors and employees of the
exempt parent. Id.
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subsidization behavior by exempt charities operating commercial
businesses.2 '
The diversion hypothesis also does not explain the tax law
difference in treatment between corporate subsidiaries and partnerships. There appears to be little difference in the diversion
potential between a controlled subsidiary and a partnership in
which the charitable parent participates as a partner. In fact, if the
partnership was managed by a separate, either for-profit or
nonprofit, management company, one would expect less, or at least
no more, potential for diversion in the partnership than in a
controlled subsidiary. Yet current tax law "imputes" the activities
of a partnership to a charitable parent, in contrast to the isolation
rule applied to corporate subsidiaries.212 Thus, despite initial
impressions, the current amalgam of legal rules does not address
the diversion concern well.
b. Economic Efficiency
While traditional unfair competition concerns have focused on
potential predatory pricing or expansion behavior by exempt
nonprofits, a broader range of issues concerns economic efficiency.
Specifically, these issues revolve around whether an exempt
charity's operation of a commercial activity creates inefficiencies in
the capital markets or the distribution of goods and services that
would not result from competition by for-profits only or if nonprofits
concentrated their resources solely on production of charitable
outputs.
As explained above, the basic source of economic inefficiency in
competition between for-profits and exempt charities is the
potential for an exempt charity to escape the corporate tax that
otherwise would be levied on commercial activities in corporate
form.213 It follows, and economists agree, that the most economically
efficient solution for dealing with commercial activity by nonprofits
211. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
212. The diversion argument is likely weaker when a charitable organization participates

in a partnership or LLC that is managed by a separate entity. In this case, the charitable
organization is an investor in the business, not an active participant, and one would presume
that management would spend no more time worrying about this investment than any other.
213. See supra Part II.A.
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is simply to repeal the corporate income tax, thus ending the
distortion in economic production resulting from the possibility of
premium financial returns by nonprofits through exemption while
simultaneously eliminating all economic distortions resulting from
the corporate income tax.21 ' Faced with the reality of the corporate
income tax and the likelihood that it will be with us for quite some
time, however, these same commentators are divided on how
current rules, particularly the UBIT, affect economic efficiency in
the context of the coexistence of the tax and the exemption for
certain charities.
Writing in 1982, Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman opined that
economic efficiency supported repealing the UBIT.2 15 She reasoned
that in markets where exit costs were high, for-profit firms could be
harmed by unexpected competition from exempt firms entering the
for-profit market and driving prices down as a result of increased
supply. 216 In these cases, high exit costs would prohibit for-profit
firms from liquidating their investment and moving to more
profitable businesses, thus resulting in a certain level of economic
harm to the for-profit investors. 21 7 Entry by exempt charities into
commercial businesses was most likely where premium financial
returns were available as a result of the charity escaping the
corporate tax.218 Because of the relatedness distinction in the UBIT,
these premium financial returns were available to exempt charities
only when their commercial activities avoided taxation by passing
the UBIT "related" test. As a result, the existence of the UBIT
pressured charities to confine commercial activities to particular
segments of the economy rather than to spread those activities over
the entire economy. This would cause disproportionate financial
harm to for-profit competitors in "related" areas. 21 9 Repealing the
214. Cordes & Weisbrod, supra note 168, at 88 (noting that a neutraltax on commercial
profits would render an exempt charity indifferent to investing in direct commercial
enterprises versus passive investments); Steinberg, supra note 13, at 356; see also
Hansmann, supranote 13, at 618 (noting that "partial exemption" from the corporate income
tax--essentially a partial repeal of the tax-for corporations whose stock is held by exempt
charities would eliminate some economic inefficiencies).
215. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 13, at 1028.
216. Id. at 1026-30.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1027 n.32.
219. Id. at 1038.
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UBIT would permit charities to enter any commercial enterprise,
thus "spreading" the potential harm across the entire economy and
permitting the economy to operate more efficiently.2 2
Professor Henry Hansmann, however, argued that some tax on
commercial activities was necessary to promote economic efficiency.22 ' Hansmann noted that without such a tax, all corporate
enterprises would be worth more in the hands of an exempt charity,
which could avoid the corporate income tax, than in the hands of
private investors."2 2 In order to capture these premium financial
returns, therefore, charities would be tempted to invest their excess
capital in a few directly-operated commercial enterprises rather
than to spread their capital over the financial markets through
passive investments.22 This trend would lead to poor diversification of investments, managerial inefficiency (because nonprofit
managers would now also be running for-profit firms), and would
pressure charities to save capital to invest in businesses rather
than to spend capital on charitable outputs. In contrast, the
existence of the UBIT helps channel charitable investments into
those areas in which the charity is likely to enjoy economies of
scope, thus enhancing efficiency. 224 Economist Richard Steinberg
agreed that " [e ixempting commercial activities from taxation when
they are undertaken by the [nonprofit] but not the [for-profit] sector
is clearly distortionary,"225 but at least as of 1991 believed that the
state of economic and empirical research on capital markets and
entry/exit issues made any conclusions about the efficiency effects
of the UBIT premature.
To the extent one believes that the UBIT promotes economic
efficiency, the combination of the UBIT, the commerciality doctrine
and the corporate separate-identity rule would only enhance that
effect. As noted above, the in terrorem effect of the commerciality
doctrine, coupled with the safe haven of the corporate separateidentity rule and resulting likely taxation of separate corporate
subsidiaries of exempt charities, limits exempt charities from fully
220. Id. at 1039.

221. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 626-27.
222. Id. at 612.
223. Id. at 614-15.

224. Id. at 626-33.
225. Steinberg, supra note 13, at 356.
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exploiting the potential for premium financial returns through the
"related" exception to the UBIT. As a result, such charities are
encouraged to invest more heavily in activities that would be
considered "related" and thus would more likely be ones that
involve economies of scope. Another response, however, that would
presumably enhance economic efficiency would be to expand the
UBIT to all commercial revenues. The resulting "neutral" tax on
commercial activity would eliminate the potential for premium
economic returns by exploiting the relatedness test under the UBIT.
This approach would eliminate the pressure identified by RoseAckerman to channel commercial activities into "related" areas
without impeding charities' exploitation of economies of scope, since
the enhanced financial returns from economies of scope exist even
if a tax is applied to the resulting revenue.2 26
c. Assessing Worth and Need for Indirect Government
Subsidies
If one agrees that permitting an exempt organization to capture
a premium financial return by avoiding the corporate tax on
commercial activities is an indirect government subsidy to the
exempt organization, 21' another policy issue arises. That issue
concerns how we should determine whether charities deserve the
subsidy they are getting and in fact need the subsidy to produce
preferred charitable outputs. 2' As Professor Mark Hall and I have
noted, an organization can be a "nonprofit" under state corporate
law without being tax-exempt; the only reason to grant exemption
226. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 627.
227. Some disagree with the subsidy characterization of tax exemption. For an overview

of non-subsidy theories of exemption, see COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 17, at 22-27. The
subsidy viewpoint, however, predominates. Id. at 26, 30 n.31; Sharpe, supra note 13, at 376
n.20. Since the publication of The Charitable Tax Exemption, Professor Evelyn Brody,

agreeing in general with the subsidy characterization, has observed that tax exemption
might best be explained as recognition by federal and state governments of a "third
sovereign" in the form of the nonprofit sector. See Evelyn Brody, Of Sovereignty and Subsidy:
Conceptualizingthe CharityTax Exemption, 23 J. CORP. L. 585 (1998). Exemption recognizes

the independence of this third sovereign as it performs its functions in its own domain, much
as constitutional theory recognizes the fiscal independence of states from the federal
government and the prohibition on taxing states directly.
228. The subject of worth and need is considered in detail in COLOMBO& HALL, supranote
17, at 9-11 and in Hall & Colombo, supra note 66, at 328-30.
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(especially for commercial business profits that would otherwise

be taxable) is to provide additional financial resources to the
exempt charity for it to carry out its charitable mission.229 Thus, two
separate questions arise: Does the charity deserve this subsidy for
its mission, and if so, how do we best match the size of the subsidy
provided to the need for financial support? To take an extreme
example of the "worth" issue, segregated schools were considered
exempt charities until the Supreme Court's decision in Bob Jones
University v. United States2 10 that segregation was incompatible
with the public policies underlying exemption.23 '
The "need" prong of the issue is more complex, but in the context
of commercial activity, one should ask whether the subsidy is being
applied to increase desirable charitable outputs, or is simply
increasing the supply of a good already being supplied in sufficient
quantity by the nonprofit sector, the for-profit sector, or the government. As Henry Hansmann has observed: "There is no reason to
believe that the amount of subsidy that is appropriate for a
particular nonprofit is proportional to its willingness or ability to
invest in unrelated businesses ....
22
The operation of I.R.C. § 170, permitting a deduction for
charitable contributions,2 3 provides a useful comparison to the
commercial activity rules on the worth and need issues. In contrast
to exemption, this subsidy 23 4 requires the external decision by
unrelated donors to make an economic transfer to a particular
229. See Hall & Colombo, supranote 15, at 1385 (noting that if doctors and patients prefer
the nonprofit form for delivery of medical services, they are free to choose that form as a
matter of state law even if tax exemption is not provided).
230. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
231. Id. at 592-96.
232. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 621.

233. I.R.C. § 170 (2000).
234. Once again, not all commentators characterize the deduction for charitable

contributions as an indirect subsidy, although once again this is the predominant view. See
generallyJohn D. Colombo, The Marketingof Philanthropyand the CharitableContributions
Deduction:IntegratingTheories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L.

REV. 657, 667-90 (2001) (explaining various theoretical characterizations of the deductions).
The subsidy characterization results from the fact that, for an individual in the highest
individual tax bracket, the deduction means that the real after-tax cost of a $100 donation
is approximately $60 because the donor gets to deduct $100 from taxable income, which
reduces the donor's tax bill by $40 if one assumes a forty percent tax rate. Thus, the $100
donation actually is funded in two parts: $60 from the individual donor, and $40 from the

government in foregone taxes.
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charity before the government subsidy "tags along." Under § 170,
therefore, individual and corporate donors perform the external
checks and balances function on worth and need through their
respective decisions to donate; that act occurs presumably because
the donor has determined that a particular charity is both worthy
of increased financial assistance and is in need of it. 235
The current system of rules regarding commercial activities
accomplishes part of this checks-and-balances function with respect
to commercial activity, but leaves much to be desired. Consider first
a world without the combination of the UBIT, the commerciality
doctrine and the separate-identity rule. Without the commerciality
doctrine as the ultimate check on worth by guarding against
subsidizing an organization that operates essentially as a for-profit,
any organization organized as a nonprofit with some nominal
charitable purpose would be eligible for exemption. 23 6 Without the
UBIT, this organization could control the size ofits own government
subsidy by acquiring any kind of direct commercial activity and still
escape the corporate income tax with essentially no check on
whether it deserved or needed such a subsidy. As Hansmann
pointed out, charities with funds to invest in unrelated businesses
either already have too much capital (in which case, additional
subsidies are unnecessary) or are "robbing" charitable outputs to
invest in for-profit businesses which would exist in any case (and
thus do not need charitable investments to fund appropriate output
levels). 2 7 In either case, the charity presumably is not spending
enough on charitable outputs, and thus has a poor claim to
additional subsidization. Finally, without the corporate separateidentity rule, this self-subsidization would extend to large corporate
conglomerates whose subsidiaries might qualify for derivative
exemption based upon the parent corporation's status, compounding
the lack-of-charitable-outputs problem.

235. In fact, Saul Levmore has characterized the § 170 deduction as a "clever tool" for

individuals to express preferences regarding government funding of organizations (charities)
that perform social service functions. These "votes" by donors signal to government
decisionmakers what organizations are worthy of subsidization. Saul Levmore, Taxes as

Ballots, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 406-09 (1998).
236. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 624.

237. Id. at 621.
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Even with these rules, however, there is no effective systemic
external check on worth or need as it applies to commercial
activities. Again, given the large swath of activities that might be
considered "related" under the current UBIT structure, plus the
empirical evidence that creative expense allocation can turn even
an unrelated activity into a zero-tax investment,3 8 the ability of the
current rules to properly control for both worth and need is
questionable. Instead, the rules act as a sort of "reasonable and
proper" speed limit, insuring that at the margin the overall size of
any indirect subsidy is limited by the ability of exempt charities to
exploit the relatedness test and the separate-identity rule.
Charities that drive too fast for conditions (i.e, get too greedy under
the system) face the potential withdrawal of exemption under the
commerciality doctrine, which serves as the ultimate backstop to
subsidizing entities that really are "for-profits in disguise." The
problem here is that the concept "too greedy" is very poorly defined
in existing law. 2 9 Although the current combination of rules helps
guard against egregious abuse of the potential indirect subsidy
resulting from direct commercial activity, the rules suffer from a
lack of administrative clarity and perform this function poorly.
Again, we should ask where there is a better way.
d. Liability Insulation
A final possible public policy concern is that if an exempt charity
directly operates a commercial activity, it places its charitable
assets at risk for the liabilities of the commercial activity and
thus runs the risk that such assets will be lost in the pursuit of
noncharitable activities. Although I have not seen this particular
hypothesis raised as a potential concern in the existing literature
on commercial activity by nonprofits, protecting charitable assets
from undue risk was the foundation for rules (long since repealed)
developed in early English law that limited charitable trustees
to certain court-approved investments. 2 0 This concern conceivably
238. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
239. See discussion supra Part II.A.
240. See BEVIS LONGSTRETH, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENTANDTHE PRUDENT MAN

RULE 3-6 (1986). The modem Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act and the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act have both attempted to further liberalize investment rules for
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could justify a set of rules similar to the current tax rules in which
direct commercial activity by exempt charities is discouraged by the
in terrorem effect of the commerciality doctrine. Funneling such
activities into separate corporate containers where such liabilities
can be limited to the commercial assets, however, is encouraged
as a result of the upstream isolation provided by the corporate
separate-identity rule. Moreover, since general partners are themselves jointly and severally liable for all partnership debts, the
asset liability rationale explains why one might treat participation
in a partnership (or at least participation as a general partner)
as the functional equivalent of directly carrying on the activity,
while applying a corporate isolation rule to activities conducted in
separate corporate containers.2 4 1
There certainly is a legitimate public interest in ensuring that
charitable assets, the creation of which has been at least partially
subsidized by tax-exemption, are not squandered in the operation
of noncharitable businesses. All investments, however, carry risk;
insurance and diversification are the primary safeguards against
such risks in the modern world. Moreover, even if the liability
concerns of direct commercial activities were significant, once again
the current rules operate very imperfectly. Our current system
clearly permits charities to engage in a variety of direct business
activities without regard to external liability potential, as long as
the charity is reasonably comfortable that the activity is either
"related" under the UBIT or, if not related, will be below whatever
threshold exists for such activities to endanger exempt status
under the "commerciality" doctrine. As a result, the current rules
do not provide any core relationship between the danger of
general liability and the pressure to isolate commercial activities in
separate corporate containers. Further, but for the potential
difference in taxation that may arise from conducting activities
in separate corporate containers, as opposed to "divisions" of an
charitable trust managers. FISHMAN& SCHWARZ, supranote 6, at 238-39. The "court list" was

replaced by the "prudent man" investment rule in the mid-1800s, although courts tended to
interpret "prudence" as inversely proportional to risk, and disapproved many kinds of
investments (short-selling, options, futures, etc.) thought to be inherently risky. Id. at 233
(providing a brief overview of the evolution from the "court list" to "prudent person" rule).
241. Of course, this would not explain why limited partners or members of an LLC, both
ofwhom enjoy limited liability, should be treated in the same manner as general partners.
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exempt organization or in partnership form, one would expect the
management of an exempt enterprise to pick the container that
would best limit business risk to other assets. This, in fact, is, how
for-profit managers consistently operate, by forming separate
subsidiary corporations in order to isolate liability for newer or
riskier parts of the business.24 2 Although, unlike their for-profit
counterparts, nonprofit managers do not face ultimate accountability to shareholders, they do have interested constituent groups
such as donors. In addition, the state Attorney General usually has
some supervisory authority over charities. If the tax laws simply
were neutral on this issue (for example, if the corporate separateidentity rule did not exist or was applied to partnerships as well as
corporations), there is no reason to believe that nonprofit managers
would not act to limit liability in the same way their for-profit
counterparts do. The overall operation of the commerciality rules,
thus, does little to address risk issues even if those issues are
considered significant policy concerns.
III. RECONSTRUCTING THE RULES TO ADDRESS THE POLICY
CONCERNS
The above analysis identifies six potential public policy concerns
with commercial activity by exempt charities. These six include the
traditional UBIT rationales of unfair competition and tax base
erosion, and four broader policy concerns: managerial diversion,
economic efficiency, checks on subsidy worth and need, and liability
insulation for charitable assets. Of these six, the four that appear
most compelling are protecting the corporate tax base, limiting
diversion, promoting economic efficiency, and providing some
check on subsidization worth and need. The UBIT standing alone
242. See WILLIMmH. PAINTER, PAINTERON CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 2.8, at 2:73 (3d ed. 1991
& Supp. 1999) ("A major purpose of forming more than one corporation may be to attain
limited liability and prevent the entire business from being exposed to the risks of each
particular phase of the business."). This practice, of course, has spawned numerous cases
regarding "piercing the corporate veil" so that creditors of subsidiary corporations could
reach the deeper pockets and asset base of the parent corporation. Thus, the historical record
from the for-profit sector indicates that if corporate managers are left alone, they
aggressively pursue liability limitation. There is no reason to believe that managers of
exempt charities would not likewise act to protect charitable assets absent competing tax
considerations.
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operates, at best, imperfectly to address all four issues, and has
particular problems with tax base erosion, managerial diversion,
and checking subsidy worth and need. Adding the commerciality
doctrine and the Moline Propertiesseparate-identity rule to the
mix substantially improves tax base protection at the cost of administrative efficiency and legal certainty, but even this combination of
rules inadequately addresses diversion concerns or subsidy worth
and need, except in the most egregious situations.
The next question, therefore, is whether the tax rules regarding
commercial activity can be reconstructed to address the major
public policy concerns while improving the doctrinal transparency
and providing certainty in application. In this Part, I examine two
general approaches to revising the rules on commercial activity and
how they would affect the doctrinal rules on commercial activity.
The first approach would permit charities to capture premium
returns on commercial activities as a method of providing an
additional government subsidy to them. It would also attempt to
address the four major policy concerns through one of three
different techniques: clarification of current doctrinal rules;
adoption of new rules as an "overlay" to existing rules; or radical
restructuring of the tests for exemption. The second approach takes
an entirely opposite view. It would attempt to eliminate the
economic incentive for direct commercial activities by taxing all
commercial activities of exempt charities.
I prefer the first approach executed by radically restructuring
the tests for exemption to adopt the donative theory of exemption
that I have previously proposed.24 In the absence of such a major
revision to the core definition of tax exemption, however, the
second approach also addresses all the major policy concerns and
is preferable to the current doctrinal uncertainty.
A. Controllingthe Economic Incentive
As noted in Part II, the best counterargument to the concerns
about tax base erosion and nonprofit managerial diversion is that
commercial activity provides a source of revenue for conducting
charitable activities. Thus, one possible choice for dealing with
243. See Hall & Colombo, supranote 15, at 1384-89.
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commercial activity is to consciously permit exempt charities to
capture the economic premiums available as a method of providing
an additional government subsidy to these organizations. Under
this scenario, protecting the corporate tax base is obviously not a
policy concern-in essence, we have chosen to give away part of the
corporate tax base as an additional subsidy to exempt charities.
Although unfair competition and asset liability issues might be
exacerbated, the analysis presented in Part III discounts the
importance of these issues in forming public policy.
What definitely is of concern, however, is the diversionary
potential of such an approach, its effects on economic efficiency, and
the lack of external checks of worth and need on the indirect
subsidy such a system would provide. As noted above, without the
combination of the UBIT, the commerciality doctrine, and the
separate-identity rule to provide at least some disincentive to
conducting direct commercial activities, the scope of those activities
would almost certainly increase dramatically, much as they did
during the period between the Trinidaddecision in 1924 and the
adoption of the UBIT in 1950. Charities presumably would undertake commercial activities solely for their premium financial return,
whether or not related to economies of scope or other economic
efficiencies. Recent empirical evidence suggests that charities are
doing just that under our current system.
Three general solutions to these problems exist. The first solution
is for the IRS to keep the current scope of the UBIT mostly intact,
recognizing that charities will be able to capture premium financial
returns on direct commercial activities that can qualify as "related"
(and therefore not taxable under the UBIT), but to clarify current
doctrine in a manner that would address the major policy concerns
raised above. In this clarification vein, two New York University
students recently suggested that the regulations under section
501(c)(3) should establish a presumption of "charitability" if the
exempt organization met a mathematical test comparing the sum
of an exempt organization's gross income plus expenditures on
unrelated activities, to the sum of gross income and expenses
from related activities. 2 " If the "unrelated" sum exceeded the
"related" sum, there would be no presumption of charitability and
244. Pefta & Reid, supra note 13, at 1886-95.
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presumably the Service could attack exempt status using the same
concepts as existing law.2 5
Although I think the note authors were on the right track with
this proposal, it is both too complex and too simple. The relative
size of commercial activities versus charitable ones is certainly a
consideration in controlling both excessive diversion and selfsubsidization. Comparing revenues plus expenses, however, is
probably unnecessary to this relative size consideration. For
example, presumably we would not be terribly concerned under this
general approach about the charitable status of an exempt
organization that made one million dollars in revenues selling
pencils if the profits from those revenues were spent on charitable
activities (for example, cross-subsidization), and if the pencil
business was not consuming more resources from the exempt
entity than its charitable program. Thus, I think one could
capture the "relative size" issue more simply by requiring that
gross expenditures on charitable activities must exceed gross
expenditures on commercial activities on a rolling three-year
average basis. This proposed test is similar to the tests already
applied under I.R.C. § 501(h) for determining when excess lobbying
expenditures should jeopardize exemption. 2 "
The students' suggestion is also too simple because it contains no
specific test to ensure that cross-subsidization is the goal of
commercial activity. Consider, for example, a situation in which a
charity has $200,000 in noncommercial revenues-to make this
simple, the $200,000 comes from donations-that it spends on
charitable activities, and also has invested $100,000 to operate a
commercial activity (for example, a gift shop) whose gross income
plus expenses are less than $400,000. Instead of operating the gift
245. Id. at 1895-96.
246. I.R.C. § 501(h) (2000). I do appreciate, of course, that any comparison test will require
extensive regulations to govern allocation of expenses between charitable and commercial
activities and that even with such regulations, one can expect some level of "slop" in the

system as currently is the case with the UBIT, see supranote 195 and accompanying text,
or other expense allocation systems (such as the uniform capitalization rules applicable to
inventory accounting). It may also require that we develop some way of valuing donated
labor in order to insure fair comparisons on "expenditures" in the commercial and charitable
activities. Nevertheless, I would prefer this approach to a more general "common law"
development of the commensurate-in-scope concept for the reasons of administrability and
compliance.

550

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:487

shop, the charity presumably could liquidate it, take the $100,000
investment and buy $100,000 in bonds that would return five
percent. Note that the hypothetical gift shop meets the proposed
"presumption" test. Now assume that although the gift shop
produces a five percent annual return, the charity's management,
enamored with running a commercial business, reinvests that
amount in the gift shop rather than using it to cross-subsidize
charitable activities. In this hypothetical case, which illustrates
perfectly the diversion problem, the operation of the commercial
activity is not "expanding the pie" of charitable services and has
simply become an end unto itself for the managers. In this
circumstance, regardless of the relative size of the charitable and
commercial activities, society presumably would be better off if our
exempt charity simply liquidated its investment and bought bonds.
Even if management decided to reinvest the annual earnings on the
bonds, it would not have the diversionary problems of operating a
gift shop-and presumably without that diversion, management
would be more likely to spend the five percent on charitable
outputs.
Thus to directly attack the diversion problem, part of this
"doctrinal clarification" approach should require that, in order for
a charity to maintain exemption when it operates a commercial
activity, it must demonstrate that revenues from the commercial
activity are spent to increase preferred charitable outputs. One
mathematical way to do this is to require that a charity's expenditures on its charitable program on average exceed its noncommercial revenues over some medium-term time (three to five
years) by a certain percentage tied to an expected baseline annual
return (perhaps tied to the long-term federal rate under I.R.C.
§ 1274(d)) on its investment in its commercial activity. Applying
this approach to the above hypothetical, if the gift shop's expected
return rate were five percent, then we would demand that the
charity spend $205,000 on its charitable outputs to meet this test.
If a charity cannot demonstrate such monetary enhancement to its
charitable program on at least some medium-term average basis,
then presumably it (and society) would be better off if it simply
discontinued its direct commercial activity and moved its money
into a passive investment. Failure to make the required showing
would indicate that the operation of the commercial activity is
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diverting management attention to some degree, the taxing system
likely is losing revenues because of it, and there is no offsetting
benefit to the charitable program that justifies that diversion or
revenue loss.247
Finally, as the student Note recognized,24 a mathematical
approach to the commerciality issue would require the Service to
address the corporate separate-identity rule as applied to assessing
exempt status, because otherwise any charity could easily escape
the rule by "sealing off" commercial activities in separate corporations. Frankly, apart from its role as a backhanded method for
controlling commercial activity by exempt charities, the corporate
separate-identity rule makes no sense in assessing exempt status.
The Moline Propertiesseparate-identity rule itself was the product
of concern about the integrity of the corporate tax base.2 4 A person
who sets up a corporation subject to the separate tax regime of
Subchapter C should not be able to easily argue that one should
ignore the separate tax existence of that entity and evade the
corporate tax. This issue was at the heart of Moline Properties.5 °
If, however, we make a policy choice not to better protect the
corporate tax base as a means of providing additional indirect
subsidies for charitable outputs, we have already addressed the
underlying issue of Moline Properties. We should then no longer
need the combination of the in terrorem effect of a doctrinally
diffuse commerciality doctrine coupled with the separate-identity
"escape hatch" to provide backhanded protection for the corporate
tax base.
247. This proposal is similar in its theoretical intent to the requirement that a private

foundation distribute a minimum of five percent return on its investments to avoid excise
taxes, I.R.C. § 4942 (2000), though the proposed test is farmore demandingin amounts spent
on charitable activities. One might well ask why we should not impose a similar test on
passive investments of public charities. Perhaps we should--but in the context of this Article,

the diversion issue which this test would address is the result of direct commercial activity,
not passive investment. Presumably, we are not worried about charitable managers
becoming obsessed with their stock portfolio performance and thereby losing the unique
nonprofit management ethic as they pour over the daily Wall Street Journal reports.
248. Pefia & Reid, supra note 13, at 1894, 1895 n. 176 (suggesting that this issue could be

addressed with the existing anti-abuse rule in place under the UBIT in § 512(b)(13), though
noting that the existing rule has some problems by rigidly limiting its definition of related
entities).
249. See Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436, 438-41 (1943).
250. Id.
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The practical question raised here, of course, is how one would
define "related" for purposes of combining entities to apply the
suggested tests. I previously suggested in the context of complex
health care organizations that we include in the definition of
"charitable enterprise" any entity that would be covered by the
"supporting organization" rules of I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) that permit
derivative public charity status, rather than using specific
ownership tests as the Treasury department suggested during the
UBIT hearings in the late 1980s.25 ' I still believe this is a viable
approach, for the following reasons. The § 509(a)(3) tests already
include situations in which corporations are under common
ownership or management.252 The only real difference between
using the § 509(a) approach and specific ownership tests is the fact
that a particular entity not under direct common ownership would
be subject to inclusion in a "related charitable group" under a "facts
-and-circumstances" test as provided in the regulations under
§ 509(a)(3). Under this test, an organization gets derivative public
charity status if it can show that it is "responsive to, and signifi25
cantly involved in the operations of," the exempt organization. 3
This test generally requires the supporting entity to meet both a
"responsiveness" component and an "integral part" component.2"4
An entity can demonstrate responsiveness by allocating one board
seat to a member of the supported entity or otherwise establishing
a "close and continuous working relationship" between the two
entities, such as by monetary contributions. 255 The integral-part
that
test is met if the supporting entity carries on activities
256
entity.
supported
the
by
on
carried
otherwise would be
In the end, the question boils down to whether entities that
are "practical" siblings should be included in an expanded charitable group. I would answer that question affirmatively for two
reasons. First, such a rule would limit the ability of exempt
charities to escape the other proposed rules by simply having a
251. Colombo, supra note 13, at 250-51.

252. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4(h) (1972).
253. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(f)(4).
254. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(i)(1).
255. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(iX5) (providing Example 1 in which the responsiveness test is met by
an organization whose sole activity was publishing and printing for churches of a particular
denomination).
256. Id. § 1.509(a)-4(iX3Xii).
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"cozy" relationship with, rather than direct control of, what is
essentially a feeder organization. Remember that the facts-andcircumstances test of § 509(a)(3) described above requires a level of
cooperation between the charity and the supporting organization
that makes the charity pay attention to what the supporting
organization is doing, and makes the supporting organization
responsive to the charity's desires. 7 If an exempt school is raising
money through an external organization nominally controlled by
the parents of schoolchildren, that operation should be considered
part of the expanded charitable entity for purposes of the clarified
doctrinal tests proposed in this Article. This flexible approach
would also address the problems inherent in using more rigid
definitions of relatedness that might easily permit avoidance
through creative corporate structures. 2
Finally, this expanded definition would also work in the opposite
direction in that it would appropriately allow an exempt charity to
"count" as charitable expenditures activities undertaken on its
behalf by a nominally independent entity. Recall that the test under
§ 509(a)(3) involves proof that the supporting organization is
carrying on a program that is an integral part of the program of the
exempt charity.2 59 In such circumstances, it is entirely appropriate
to count those expenditures as part of the overall charitable
program in question.
A second general approach to the path of managing incentives
for commercial activity is to broaden the scope of the current
indirect subsidy while enacting additional rules that would overlay
current law in order to specifically address the aforementioned
policy concerns. Arguing that current revenue sources are inadequate to support the activities of exempt charities, Professor
Donald Sharpe proposed such an approach via an elective credit
against the tax that otherwise would be due under the UBIT if
business profits are used to support related charitable activities. 60
To address the diversion problem, Professor Sharpe suggested rules
that would limit total investments in direct business enterprises to
twenty-five percent of a charity's total investment portfolio and to
257.
258.
259.
260.

See supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text.
See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 253-56 and accompanying text.
Sharpe, supranote 13, app. A (describing Professor Sharpe's proposal).
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deny charitable managers the ability to serve as employees or
directors of any unrelated business for which the credit is used.26 1
To address unfair competition, Professor Sharpe would require a
showing that a charity charges competitive prices in its commercial
activities.2 2
Professor Sharpe did not consider how his system might affect
the commerciality doctrine or the corporate separate-identity rules,
but one could imagine combining his system with some of the
suggestions for doctrinal clarification of current law made above.
Under his system, for example, the commensurate-in-scope test
would presumably be jettisoned in favor of the credit to encourage
"commensurate" activities. One also could compute Professor
Sharpe's twenty-five percent limit by including all "related" entities
under a test similar to that proposed above, and the IRS could still
clarify the "primary purpose" language to impose a mathematical
gross-expenditure test.26 3
Ultimately, however, both the "doctrinal clarification" approach
and Sharpe's "elective credit" approach suffer from the same main
problems. Neither contains an external check on worth or need for
the indirect subsidy provided by commercial activities. Exempt
entities could self-subsidize (at least up to the limits proposed by
each system) by acquiring direct commercial activities.26 4 In each
system, therefore, charities could grow internally without anyone
ever questioning whether the charitable services provided are in
fact useful to or valued by the community, except in the context of
revoking exemption. Moreover, neither system would address the
problem created when commercial activity itself arguably falls
under the definition of "charitable" as is the case with nonprofit
hospitals or religious publishers. Finally, neither system really
simplifies the law in this area. In fact, either proposal would make
the rules more complex.
261. Id. at 404-05.
262. Id.
263. It should be noted that I am not certain that Professor Sharpe would agree with these

changes.
264. To be fair, this is exactly the result Professor Sharpe prefers; his view is that without
additional subsidies, exempt charities are at serious financial risk. Sharpe, supra note 13,
at 406-09. This, for him, answers the "need" question and, although he does not say so
specifically, presumably the initial qualification of an organization as tax exempt answers
the "worth" question.

20021

CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION

555

The third approach to managing the incentive for commercial
activities, however, would address all of these problems. The
solution is to completely restructure the underlying tests for tax
exemption so that these issues are addressed as part of the
exemption process. In fact, Professor Mark Hall and I proposed
such a system in the early 1990s.2 "5 Under our donative theory, the
UBIT would be repealed.2 6 Exemption would be granted based
upon certain baseline levels of donations (one-third of gross
revenues), which would provide a self-correcting system to check
the worth and need of organizations seeking indirect subsidies and
the size of commercial activities. 7 As commercial revenues
increase, the percentage of total revenues represented by donations
(assuming they remained constant) would decrease. Accordingly, if
charitable managers wanted their organizations to remain taxexempt, they would have to self-limit the size of non-donative
revenues to roughly twice the amount of donations, thus insuring
that commercial activity would be limited in overall amounts.
Moreover, if organizations "self-subsidized" too much by acquiring
direct commercial activities, the absolute level of donations would
likely fall as donors perceived reduced worth and need for
subsidization. Accordingly, organizations which too heavily invested
in direct commercial activities and became "for-profits in disguise"
would over time lose exemption through the combination of
increasing non-donative revenues and decreasing donations.2 8
Thus, although we did not address this specific point in our earlier
works, the commerciality doctrine would not be needed to provide
the ultimate check against exempting a "for-profit in disguise."
Similarly, because donors would likely assess the worth and need
of a complex organization as an integrated whole, the system would
not need the corporate separate-identity rule. In fact, it would be
more appropriate to apply the baseline donative test to a complex

265. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 17, at 175-79; Hall & Colombo, supra note 15, at 144246.
266. COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 17, at 175-79.
267. Id. at 198-99.

268. See id. at 129-30 (hypothesizing that there is a "market in altruism" in which donors
assess the worth and need of competing charities before making donation decisions).
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organization by aggregating all related entities so that the overall
revenues were subject to the one-third test."8 9
In addition to directly addressing the issue of worth and need,
this system also would directly address the diversion potential of
commercial activities by making charitable managers even more
sensitive to whether donors believed the organization was pursuing
a desirable charitable purpose. A probable indirect by-product of the
system, moreover, would be that charities would be most likely to
exploit commercial activities with clear economies of scope (thus
improving economic efficiency), since those activities could most
easily be "sold" to donors either as a natural extension of the
charitable mission or as prudent exploitation of excess capacity.2 70
Accordingly, this system would address all the significant public
policy issues surrounding commercial activity while greatly
simplifying the rules in this area. As a result, if managing the
incentive for commerical activity by exempt charities is the path we
desire to take, the only method to do so that fully addresses all the
policy issues involved is a radical restructuring of the standards for
exemption along the donative theory lines.
B. Eliminatingthe Incentive for Direct CommercialActivity by
Expanding the UBIT
Given that radical restructuring of the tests for tax exemption is
unlikely to occur,27 1 however, and recognizing that other proposed
269. See supra notes 251-59 and accompanying text for a discussion of my proposed rules

for aggregating entities in complex enterprises.
270. Empirical observations of certain nonprofit sectors indicate that commercial activity
has a negative impact on donations, although this negative impact does not appear to be true
in the nonprofit hospital or university settings. Lewis M. Segal & Burton A. Weisbrod,
Interdependence of Commercial and Donative Revenues, in To PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT,

supra note 1, at 105-27. Thus, nonprofit managers appear to avoid commercial activity that
is arguably inconsistent with their charitable mission because of the fear it will depress
donations. See James, supra note 200, at 274 ("[Nonprofit managers'] reluctance to rely on
sales revenue may stem more from its expected impact on donations...."). Under the donative

approach to defining exemption, one would expect this effect to become more pronounced:
managers would engage in commercial activity only when they believed donors would not
react negatively-that is, where they could explain to potential donors that the commercial
activity was merely an extension of the charitable mission or prudent resource utilization.
271. Despite my conscientious hawking of the donative theory for almost ten years, it
appears no closer to adoption than before Mark Hall and I proposed it back in 1991. The last
serious congressional discussion of exemption standards was in the context of President
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methods of controlling the financial incentives relating to
commercial activity have their own problems, perhaps the next best
solution is to take a completely different approach: eliminate the
premium financial returns available for such activities by
expanding the UBIT to cover all commercial revenues. Other
commentators have suggested a commerciality-based test for
taxation as opposed to a relatedness test to address the unfair
competition issue.2 72 The real reasons to prefer this approach,
however, have less to do with preventing unfair competitionwhich, as noted above, probably is not a significant policy issue at
all-than with (1) addressing the major policy concerns of tax-base
erosion, managerial diversion, economic efficiency, and the
worth/need issues with self-subsidization and (2) simplifying
existing law with respect to the commerciality doctrine and the
corporate separate-identity rule.

Clinton's ill-fated health care reform bill, and even then the discussion was limited to
exemption for hospitals and health care providers. I don't need any realism enhancement
therapy to recognize that the prospects for fundamental reform of the tests for exemption are
zero, although I continue to believe that adopting our donative theory (or some reasonably
close facsimile thereof) would create a far more administrable and far simpler tax system in
this area while still preserving the essence of pluralism (by relying on donations as the
baseline test of exemption) that underlies the charitable sector.
272. Small business advocates strongly pushed an expanded UBIT in the congressional
hearings on the UBIT in the late 1980s as a means of controlling "unfair" competition. See,
e.g., UnrelatedBusiness Income Tax: HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Oversightof the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 100th Cong. 105 (1987) (testimony of Frank Swain, Chief
Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration). During this same period, James
Bennett and Gabriel Rudney proposed a commerciality test for taxing commercial activities
as a replacement for the current relatedness test under the UBIT. Bennett & Rudney, supra
note 16, at 1095-97. Bennett & Rudney listed eight reasons for adopting a commerciality tax,
the first two of which were directly related to unfair competition. Their list did include
references to the other policy issues of economic efficiency, unnecessary subsidization, and
tax-base erosion, but they did not consider how an expanded commerciality tax would
interface with the existing commerciality doctrine and the corporate separate-identity rule
and did not address specifically the issue of managerial diversion.
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Taxing all commercial activity, of course, would directly address
the traditional tax policy concerns of tax-base protection2 7 s and
273. This approach, however, still would need to deal with the prospect for creative
allocation of expenses between charitable activities and commercial ones in order to
minimize taxable income from commercial activities. See supranote 196 and accompanying
text. Professor Evelyn Brody has suggested that administering a "mixed" system in which
nontaxed charitable activities exist side-by-side with taxable activities may be impossible,
and may even encourage a kind of "stuffing" behavior in which charities attempt to "pair"
profit-making activities with activities producing tax losses in order to minimize taxable
income. Evelyn Brody, Charitiesin Tax Reform. Threatsto Subsidies Overt and Covert, 66
TENN. L. REV. 687, 733 (1999).
I am obviously more optimistic that this system would work, for several reasons. First, it
is not clear that all "related" activities are money-losing ones. In fact, recent empirical work
suggests that there are significant profit-making activities which are untaxed because either
we have included them (erroneously, I believe) in the core definition of "charitable" or
because we have permitted them to fall into the untaxed "related" category. See, e.g.,
Yetman, supranote 196, at 305 (presenting survey results indicating substantial profits are
being reported by exempt organizations from nontaxable activities). By eliminating
relatedness as a test for non-taxability, the system would pick up these activities as part of
the tax-base.
Second, this change would eliminate the possibility that profit-making activities now
escaping taxation under the "related" rubric (for example, museum gift shops, university
dining halls, bingo games, corporate sponsorship payments) are themselves a source of reallocable expenses. Say, for example, that a charity has $200 in overhead expenses that it
would incur as a result of its charitable program in any event. It also has two businesses.
Business A has $100 of profit on revenues of $500 and expenses of $400, whereas Business
B has $250 in profit on revenues of $1000 and expenses of $750. Note that in this scenario,
the charity cannot zero-out income from Business B simply by creatively allocating the
overhead expenses from its charitable activity (even if it could allocate 100%of such expenses
to Business B, which it cannot, it would still show a $50 profit). If the charity takes the
position that Business A is "related" (ergo, not taxable in any event), however, it presumably
could creatively allocate some of that business' $400 expenses to Business B (such an
allocation would increase Business A's profit, but because it is "related," that profit would go
untaxed anyway), thus producing a zero effect. In this scenario, if the tax law included
Business A in the tax base, then the charity could no longer zero-out its income, and an
expanded UBIT would affect the financial incentives to engage in both businesses-if we
assume that the charity could only reallocate $100 of its overhead without going "over the
edge" on aggressiveness, then presumably the rational charity in this scenario would zero-out
its income for Business A, divest itself of Business B (because it cannot now capture a
premium financial return by avoiding the corporate income tax), and invest the proceeds in
passive investments earning the same after-tax return.
Third, our system probably has room to refine expense-allocation methods to further
tighten the noose around the cross-allocation scenario, such as by eliminating the possibility
of allocating costs for fixed expenses that would be incurred fully as a result of the charitable
activities in any event. See Cordes & Weisbrod, supra note 168, at 102 (noting that the
current rules permit allocation of costs even where those costs would have been incurred
fully in the operation of the charitable activities alone).
Finally, as I note in the text below, it would be unusual to classify as "commercial" an
activity that never earned a profit or, indeed, was structured in a manner in which profit was
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"unfair" competition if the latter indeed is a concern at all. At the
same time, however, this approach would also address the other
major policy issues. By eliminating the premium financial return
available from "related" activities under current law, exempt
charities would presumably have no incentive to engage in direct
business activities except when they enjoy significant economies of
scope because of excess capacity relating to their charitable outputs.
Thus, this approach would address simultaneously the diversion
problem by making direct commercial activity an unattractive
investment except in economies-of-scope situations; 274 promote
economic efficiency for the same reason, and eliminate the worth
and need issues of potential self-subsidization by simply eliminating the subsidy. If one believes that asset liability exposure is
also a significant concern, this approach indirectly addresses that
issue as well. Again, this approach succeeds by largely eliminating
the incentive for direct commercial activity and by equalizing
derivative tax-exemption treatment for corporate and noncorporate
entities so that managers engaging in commercial activities can
pursue the best liability-limiting option without worrying about
exemption effects.
A serious practical problem of this approach, however, concerns
how one draws the line between taxable commercial activities and
nontaxable but revenue-producing "charitable" activities. Many
charities, for example, impose "user fees" in the form of tuition,

not a goal. See infra notes 281-82 and accompanying text (discussing the case of the

pharmacy whose activity was to sell medicines at cost to the poor and elderly). The expanded
commerciality tax proposed in the text would not be "elective" so that charities could easily
-stuff" money-losing activities into the commercial pot to offset "real" profits. Our system in
fact has already dealt with this problem extensively via the requirement of a profit motive
in order to qualify an activity for deductible trade or business expenses under § 162, in the
hobby loss provisions of§ 183, and in the passive activity regulations under § 469. I.R.C. §§

162, 183, 469 (2000). All of these provide potential models to deal with charitable loss
stuffing, if in fact it becomes a problem.
274. See Hansmann, supra note 13, at 627 (recognizing that expanding the UBIT should
not impair economic efficiency, since charities would have every reason to engage in
activities that involved significant economies of scope even if such activities were taxed).

Hansmann concludes that the current structure of the UBIT should be left largely
unchanged, but he does not consider in his analysis the noneconomic policy issues considered
in the text above (such as managerial diversion) nor the opportunity to simplify the existing
tax rules by jettisoning the commerciality doctrine and the corporate separate-identity rule.
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or admission charges. Would these revenue sources be subject to
taxation under an expanded commerciality tax?
For the answers, we should return to the policy issues. The
problems with commercial activity largely stem from the premium
financial returns that result from a charity escaping the corporatelevel tax on a particular economic activity. If, however, a particular
activity could not be sustained by a for-profit entity in the private
market, there is no premium financial return to capture. Such
activities would not produce taxable revenues in any event and
these cases of "market failure" should be exactly the types of
services delivered by exempt organizations.275 Thus, the heart of the
target for a commercial-activity tax should be revenue-producing
activities that are no different in essence from those provided by
taxable for-profit companies, and which we could reasonably
assume would be provided by for-profits in any event. This analysis
in turn means that the doctrinal test of a commercial activity
should hinge on whether a specific revenue-producing activity
competes with for-profit organizations that provide substantially
the same good or service.
In some cases, determining whether a product or service
competes with for-profit providers will be relatively simple. There
are no for-profit primary schools in Champaign County, Illinois.
Accordingly, it is not difficult to conclude that the tuition charged
by private nonprofit schools is not commercial revenue that should
be taxed under an expanded commercial activity tax. Similarly, at
the other end of the spectrum, it is not difficult to conclude that a
hospital offering a full-service health club to the general community
under the guise of a community "wellness" program is competing
directly with for-profit health clubs in the same geographic area
and thus its health club profits should be taxed.
In many cases, however, the competition factor will require more
extensive analysis, particularly in the case of "user fees." Take, for
example, the nonprofit community theater that sits across the
street from a for-profit theater. If the nonprofit theater charges
admission, should it be subject to a commerciality tax on admission
revenues if it in fact makes a profit? James Bennett and Gabriel
Rudney suggested that this question could best be answered by
275. See COLOMBO & HALL, supra note 17, at 99-104.
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requiring the exempt organization to prove that the costs of
producing the service in question were at least fifty percent
subsidized by "non-sales" revenues such as donations, government
grants, and volunteer labor.276 Although such a bright-line approach
is appealing, it misses the core issue, which is to determine whether
a particular good or service in fact would be provided by the forprofit sector. Any activity that requires subsidization by definition
is not a candidate for an expanded commerciality tax, because, if a
subsidy is needed to cover costs, that activity would not produce any
taxable income in any event.27 7
Instead, on this issue I prefer a more facts and circumstances
approach directed at the ultimate issue of determining whether a
good or service is "substantially the same" as that provided by the
for-profit sector. In making this determination, much of the Tax
Court's current analysis, adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Living
2 7 regarding what factors
Faith,
make an activity "commercial," is
relevant. 279 That is, one might look at an organization's pricing
structure and the general conduct of its activity to determine how
commercial in nature it really is. For example, if the community
theater in my hypothetical routinely chooses productions that are
shunned by commercial theaters for their lack of profit potential,
then one might well conclude that the community theater does not
in fact compete with the for-profit theater because they are not
really producing "substantially the same" service. 2 Similarly,
contrary to the Eighth Circuit's analysis in FederationPharmacy
276. Bennett & Rudney, supra note 16, at 1097.

277. If one was interested in a bright-line test, the test would not focus on subsidization,
but on the rate of return generated-the question is whether the rate ofreturn generated by
the nonprofit is equal, or nearly equal, to the rate of return generated by alternative
investments of similar risk.
278. Living Faith, Inc. v. Comm'r, 950 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1991); see also supra notes 54-55
and accompanying text (discussing the Living Faith case).
279. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text. Of course, under the proposed test,
these factors would be used to determine whether a particular activity is commercial, and

therefore subject to taxation, rather than used to determine whether the organization is
eligible for baseline tax exemption.
280. See, e.g., Goldsboro Art League v. Comm'r., 75 T.C. 337, 343-45 (1980) (holding that
operation of an art gallery that did not pick works for commercial exploitation potential was
not "commercial"); Plumstead Theater Soc'y v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324, 1333 (1980) (holding
that a community theater company was not "commercial" based on differences between a
community theater and a for-profit theater in selection of works, performance values, etc.).
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Services," a pharmacy that sells primarily to the elderly and poor
at reduced prices sufficient only to cover costs plus depreciation is
simply not operating as a commercial pharmacy would, and we
might well conclude that this activity is not commercial in the first
instance. Such a decision would be based on a policy decision that
the activity is, in fact, a kind of preferred charitable output that
exemption should encourage, not discourage.2 82
The expanded commerciality tax as implemented above also
should eliminate the need for the commerciality doctrine and the
corporate separate-identity rule. If no indirect subsidy is available
from direct commercial activity in the first place, there is no need
for the commerciality doctrine as the ultimate backstop to withdraw
exemption from organizations that have become "too commercial"
to avoid government subsidization of activities that do not deserve
or need it. Put another way, even if an organization had a nominal
tax exemption, it would be taxable on all its commercial revenues;
ergo, there is little reason from a tax-system perspective to pull
exempt status from entities that have some claim to exemption
but also engage in significant commercial activity. Moreover,
adopting a broad entitlement to baseline exemption would permit
organizations to retain tax benefits such as tax-deductible
donations for their charitable activity, whatever it may be. For
example, if donors wish to make contributions to a nonprofit
hospital to support medical research, there is no reason to "punish"
the organization with complete repeal of exemption simply because
ninety percent of its revenue comes from a commercial activity (the
delivery of health services for a fee). Thus I would couple this
expanded UBIT approach with a repeal of the primary purpose rule
and the commerciality doctrine, making it clear that an entity could
281. Fed'n Pharmacy Servs. v. Comm'r, 625 F.2d 804, 807-09 (8th Cir. 1980).
282. This is another good example of why Bennett & Rudney's commerciality test is
misplaced. See Bennett & Rudney, supra note 16, at 1097-98. A for-profit firm would not
operate a business at zero profit margin, even though this "business" could survive as a
nonprofit as long as it covered its costs. One response, of course, is that such a business
would not be subject to tax under an expanded UBIT inany event, because it would make
no profit to tax. But it is possible that such an operation would in fact produce a profit in any
year simply as a result of prudent budget strategy. Realizing that budgeting is imperfect, one
would prudently set a price that would provide some small operating "cushion" to cover
unanticipated expenses; if these did not occur, the "cushion" would turn into an end-of-year
profit.
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achieve baseline tax exemption with any significant charitable
activity while recognizing that all commercial activity profits,
related or not, would be subject to tax.
2 83
As an illustration, under this approach both Scripture Press
and Presbyterian & Reformed Publishing2 .4 would be entitled to
baseline exemption as religious organizations. To the extent,
however, that courts in both cases concluded that their publishing
businesses were essentially indistinguishable from commercial
publishing houses, both entities would be fully taxable on their
commercial publishing revenues. Nonprofit hospitals that engaged
in some charitable activity such as medical research also would be
entitled to a baseline exemption, but taxed on their income from the
commercial activity of delivery of health services for a fee, inasmuch
as little empirical evidence exists that their range of services or
pricing structure differs in any way from for-profit competitors. A
YMCA or similar nonprofit organization that operates a high-end
health club might have baseline exemption as a result of its
education programs or service to the poor, but would be taxed on
its downtown health club membership revenues. The publishing
houses, the hospital and the "Y" then still could solicit taxdeductible contributions to support their charitable outputs. If
donors were convinced of the worth and need of doing so in light of
the significant commercial activity, there is no reason for the taxing
system to object.
Finally, the corporate separate-identity rule also should be
jettisoned under an expanded commerciality tax. Just as we do not
need the corporate separate-identity rule in a world where society
consciously chooses to let charities capture premium returns
from commercial activities as a method of additional indirect
subsidization, we also do not need the rule if we make a policy
choice to better protect the corporate tax-base in the exempt
organizations world via an expanded commerciality tax. Such a tax
already addresses the corporate tax-base protection issues that
8 5
gave rise to Moline Properties.

283. See Scripture Press Found. v. United States, 285 F.2d 800 (Ct. C1. 1961).
284. See Presbyterian & Reformed Publ'g v. Comm'r, 743 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984).
285. See Moline Props., Inc. v. Comm'r, 319 U.S. 436, 438-41 (1943).
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Under an expanded commerciality tax, moreover, neither the
upstream nor downstream isolation effects of the corporate
separate-identity rule make any sense. Upstream isolation is
simply unnecessary, since part of the proposed approach would be
to permit an organization with any significant charitable activity to
claim exemption while paying tax on all commercial profits. As a
result, it would no longer make any difference to exempt status if
a commercial activity were isolated in a subsidiary. As long as the
parent were conducting some substantial charitable activity, it
would be eligible for baseline exempt status, but both parent and
subsidiary would pay tax on all commercial revenues.
Similarly, there is no reason to limit derivative exemption for
related entities under a system in which those entities are paying
tax on all commercial profits. Take the example of an integrated
health care network whose parent is tax-exempt because it engages
in medical research. The parent creates a wholly-owned subsidiary
to operate an HMO. There is no public policy reason under an
expanded commerciality tax approach to deny baseline exempt
status to a separately-incorporated subsidiary operating an HMO,
because the HMO presumably would pay tax on profits from its
"commercial" activity of selling health services for a fee, just as the
parent would if it operated the HMO directly. The only real effect
of this proposal at the federal tax level would be to permit the HMO
to receive tax-deductible contributions directly. Since these
contributions could go to the parent anyway (which could then
transfer them to the subsidiary at its discretion as a capital
contribution without tax consequences), and the parent would
have control over the contributions whether they were made to
the parent directly or to the subsidiary, who cares if the rules
permit the HMO to receive these contributions directly? Finally,
eliminating the separate-identity principle with respect to judging
exempt status will put all business forms on equal footing for this
purpose, avoiding the situation where management's choice of the
appropriate business container is constrained solely by issues
dealing with how the activities in that container will or will not
affect exemption for a related entity.
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I would again use the supporting organization tests of§ 509(a)(3)
286
for practical implementation of an "expanded" charitable group.
As noted above, this test covers both direct common control
situations and also includes a facts and circumstances test to
permit derivative public charity status under existing laws where
two organizations work together for a common goal even if not
technically affiliated in a parent/subsidiary relationship. In an
expanded commerciality-tax world, it would make sense to permit
generous derivative exemption for the same reasons justifying
generous baseline exemption. Granting exempt status broadly
would not impair the federal tax-base or contravene any of the
public policy concerns with commercial activity as all such activity
would be taxed and exempt status would provide organizations the
ability to solicit contributions for its charitable outputs and enjoy
the other tax benefits relating to its charitable activity. Thus, the
parent group in my earlier exempt-school hypothetical would
receive exempt status because of its close working relationship with
the school (even absent a technical control relationship), permitting
it to solicit deductible contributions for its work for the school-an
entirely appropriate result as long as the group is taxable on its
28 7
profits from operating a bingo parlor.
CONCLUSION

The Service, courts, and other commentators generally have
approached commercial activity by exempt charities on a piecemeal
basis, dealing with the revocation of exemption, or taxability under
the UBIT, or "derivative" exemption without considering how these
various pieces of the puzzle fit together. The result, as Part I of this
Article demonstrates, is a doctrinal mess. The best that can be said
of our current rules is that, precisely because they are so vague and
unpredictable, they provide a backhanded method of addressing
some of the policy concerns with commercial activity by exempt
charities (primarily the concern with erosion of the corporate taxbase and, to a lesser degree, economic efficiency) by pressuring risk286. I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (2000); see supra notes 252-56 and accompanying text (discussing
the Treasury Regulations implementing this section).

287. Yes, I also would repeal the special UBIT exception for bingo games. I.R.C. § 513(f)
(2000).
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averse managers to isolate commercial activity in separate
corporate subsidiaries, where it will almost certainly be taxed.
Whatever the merits of ambiguity in the law generally, relying on
doctrinal uncertainty ought to be a last resort to accomplish policy
goals in the tax field, where taxpayer compliance and excessive
regulatory discretion are daily concerns. Moreover, the current
rules do relatively little to address other major policy issues, such
as managerial diversion and assessment of the worth and need for
an additional indirect government subsidy.
As a result, this Article has examined two general alternatives to
dealing with the policy concerns regarding commercial activity by
exempt charities. One such approach would be to make a conscious
policy choice to permit charities to capture a portion of the corporate tax as an additional subsidy for their charitable outputs by
either leaving the current contours of the UBIT unchanged or
repealing it entirely. Without radically restructuring the rules regarding qualification for tax exemption, however, such an approach
would need complex statutory provisions to address public policy
concerns regarding managerial diversion and to insure that the
subsidy was properly used to expand charitable outputs. Moreover,
without radical restructuring of the tests for tax-exemption, this
approach essentially would permit a charity to "self-subsidize"
through the acquisition of commercial businesses, without any
external check on whether the charity needs or deserves such
subsidy. This outcome would stand in stark contrast to the
charitable contributions deduction under I.R.C. § 170, where the
government subsidy tracks the individual taxpayers' assessments
of worth and need. 8
As a result, if we are not prepared to radically alter the underlying tests for tax exemption (an approach I prefer), then we should
consider eliminating the economic incentives for direct commercial
activity by expanding the reach of the UBIT. Under this approach,
we would repeal the commerciality doctrine and permit any
organization pursuing some charitable purpose to qualify for a
baseline exemption. Because the organization would be taxed on all
commercial revenues, however, the tax system would not suffer any
revenue losses and the incentive to engage in direct commercial
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activity would be minimal except in cases in which the charity has
significant economies of scope. As a result, this approach should
itself produce the desirable side effects of reducing the potential
for managerial diversion, promoting economic efficiency, and
rendering moot the issue of policing the worth/need for an indirect
subsidy. The expansion of the UBIT to a general commerciality
tax, moreover, removes whatever tax policy reason exists to
enforce the Moline Propertiesseparate-identity rule with respect
to judging exempt status for parts of a complex charitable organization. Instead, we should permit relatively liberal derivative
exemption, knowing that all profits from commercial activities will
be taxed, no matter what "container" they come in, while at the
same time preserving the benefits of exemption (e.g., the ability to
attract deductible donations) for the organization as a whole.
This latter approach, of course, requires one to agree that the
policy dangers of expanded commercial activity, including current
doctrinal uncertainty, constitute a more serious problem than the
loss of the indirect subsidy provided by the current system with
respect to activities deemed "related" under the current UBIT. I
am certain that not everyone would agree with that conclusion.
Regardless of which approach one favors, however, recognizing that
commercial activity encompasses more than just the rules on the
UBIT is important. Given the current state of the law in this area,
adopting some integrated approach to commercial activity that
would address the scope of the UBIT, the commerciality doctrine,
and the corporate separate-identity rule together would be a very
worthwhile improvement to the legal climate for exempt charities.

